The causes of wars debate in Africa, and its implications for African military expenditures. by Owusu-Sekyere, Bernard Nyarko.
The causes of wars debate in Africa, and its implications 
for African military expenditures 
Bernard Nyarko Ownsn - Sekyere 
M.Th (Theology & Development - UKZN-PMB) 
B.Th Hons (Theology & Development - UN) 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Commerce 
(MCom) in the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), School of Finance, Economics and 
Management Studies, Howard College, Durban, South Africa. 
June 30, 2007 
Declaration 
I, Owusu - Sekyere, Bernard Nyarko, hereby declare that this thesis, unless specified in 
the text, is my original work. I also declare that I have not submitted this research project 
for any other purpose at any other institution or university. 
Bern~ekyere ~ /v-l. / t!>:r Date ' I 




To the voluntary staff and the students who had the opportunity to be part of the CRPS 
programme at UKZN for initiating and participating in a programme Africa needs so 
urgently. May the labour invested and the yield result in emerging hope for positive and 




The dissertation reviewed "the causes of war debate in Africa, and its implications for 
African military expenditures" by levelling the argument of greed hypothesis as 
inconsistent with the pragmatic ground situation in Africa that can properly inform 
optimal decision-making. The arguments raised support the debunking of greed claim 
that opportunity to pillage state resources, supersedes issues of grievance as cause of civil 
war. This work discussed the major civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, the 
study raised concerns that, by taking stance with greed has the tendency to make 
traditional state security the utmost policy concern. That also provides cost benefit excuse 
for state actors to give milex priority over other social sectors in budget prioritizing. It is 
argued that greed does not offer the platform for durable peace pursuit. The dissertation 
then showed that grievance is consistent with causes of civil war in Africa due to its 
multifarious outlook of conflicts. Grievance hypothesis, is supported because it offers 
practically approach to pursue endurable conflict, and problem solving approach to 
conflict analysis in Africa. Grievance encourages a policy of milex reduction and 
encourages peacebuilding effort. The study concluded by saying that none of the debate 
grievance and that of greed's validity justify the heinous carnage and destruction involved 
in African civil wars. Therefore what compels leaders to find solution with violence as a 
result of opportunity not based on resource per se, but it also involves misplaced priority 
to find lasting solution to grievance issues. It also involves the opportunity to heroism 
based on distorted perception of power and lack of social education on appropriate means 
to conflict resolution, and lack of appropriate early warning mechanism and trivialization 
of conflict warnings as happened in ECOWAS, East-Central Africa. Nine 
recommendations suggested in the dissertation centres on the causes of new civil wars 
debates and policy; the study of cases of new civil wars in SSA; and on the influence of 
new civil wars debate on rnilex. 
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1.1. Background and Issues 
The study and debate surrounding the causes of wars date back to the period of 
Thucydides. Howard (2001: 29) say war is "a phenomenon which, if we fail to abolish it, 
might well abolish us". The debate surrounding the causes of wars has become an 
academic discipline known as International Relations (IR) and is the subject of research. 
International Relations is concerned with 'relations between supply and demand in the 
global market. It further deals with the international and domestics of individual states 
so that you can learn where the best opportunities are' and most, pertinent to this study, 
it 'can also inform you of the prospects for war and peace around the globe' and provide 
the framework or parameters or organising device to conduct review, assessment and 
analysis of issues within this context (Duncan 2002: 2, 3; Holsti 1995: 4, 5). However, 
IR failed to prevent World War II (WW-II) from taking place. The debate on the causes 
of wars has also become one of the key subjects of interest in Peace Studies as 
discipline. In peace studies, human security research is fundamental for achieving peace. 
The peace and conflict studies pertaining to wars can divided into three main periods. 
The credit is due firstly to the early research pioneers whose interest in the studies about 
conflict and wars surfaced before WW-II. Academically, from late the 1920s and into 
the 1930s, researchers like Sorokin. Richardson from England, and Wright an American 
conducted studies on war as they sought to find solution to wide scale war such as the 
two World Wars (WWs). Initial ideas on conflict, early warning and prevention 
originated with them. Quincy'S work on variety of empirical synthesis factors has 
influenced war prevention concepts (Centre for Conflict Resolution 2002: Unit 2). 
Within this period Gandhi had also been compiling his satyagraha ('struggle for truth') 
concept which began in South Africa and was further developed on his return to India. 
Gandhi's non-violent action (ahimsa) was the key method of struggle against British 
imperialist colonial rule and eventual independence ofIndia in 1947 (King, Mary 1999: 
13, 15,29,30,31, 73). 
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The median stage started in the 1950s after WW-II had ended. Conflict studies gained 
more importance as experts sought to understand the dynamics of conflict as a result of 
the devastation after WW-II. Nader and Grande (2002: 574f) purport that the 
conceptualization of conflict resolution focused on providing understanding from many 
disciplines such as social organization, religion, economic interdependence, 
international relations, national politics, industrial relations, communities, families or 
between individuals. Further studies in the late 1960s by Dahrendorf posit that conflict 
is unavoidable and normal in human society. There have been other subsequent 
pioneering contributors such as Boulding due who proposed scientific analysis of wars 
as solution to IR incompetence after WW-II. He hypothesized that war is an aspect of a 
sovereign state, therefore by reforming international organizations and increasing 
research in the area war could be prevented. Burton date is credited with his Needs 
Theory and involvement in the 'protracted social conflict concept'. He shared the same 
intrinsic hypothesis as Dahrendorf. Furthermore other scholars have to continue with 
where the pioneers left off. For instance, Kelman had influenced areas in conflict 
resolution by negotiation, and is credited with the origin of the Journal of Conflict 
Resolution in 1957, and the Centre for Conflict Research in 1959. Curle date 
researched African conflicts using the Biafra war in Nigeria as a case study and noted 
issues of society and development as factors involved in intra-state wars (Source: 
Centre for Conflict Resolution 2002 - Unit 2). 
The third stage of development of war research began in the 1970s when emerging 
colonized countries coming out from liberation wars were plunged into internal state 
conflicts. Within this period the most influential researchers included Galtung whose 
concept on peace being distinguished into two conceptual streams, namely, positive and 
negative peace emerged (Source: Centre for Conflict Resolution 2002 - Unit 2). His 
works, in 1975, showed conceptual distinctions between peacekeeping, peacemaking 
and peacebuilding. Boutrous-Ghalis' 1992 report entitled "Agenda for Peace", made 
peacebuilding an urgent and critical conceptual issue for the UN considering the nature 
and level of intra-state wars in the developing world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa 
(UN (A/47/277-SI24111) 1992: Section VI). This outlook of the peacebuilding concept 
has led to the formation, in 2005 of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC) by Kofi 
Annan as an advisory intergovernmental body at the UN (Scott and Wyeth 2006: 3, 4). 
The PBC functions are first to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources 
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and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and 
recovery. Secondly it aims to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-
building efforts necessary for recovery, bridging the gap between the immediate post-
conflict phase and sustainable development. Thirdly it is to provide recommendations 
and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the 
UN. This means that the international community is poised to pursue peace-building as 
a critical item on the agenda, not only for peace but also for development which has 
been elusive because of wars in developing countries (Cockell 2003: 26). In 2005 UN 
Report indicated Africa had fallen behind its targets and was struggling with its 
development agenda. Now, out of the projected number of 353 million people living in 
poverty in the world by 2015, about 53% will be in SSA, indicating an increase by 29% 
(UNDP 2005). 
The debate on the causes of war increased in 1990 's as major world organisations such a 
s the UN and international Financiers in particular seeks to find better policy approaches 
to prevent the recurrence of wars in the developing world. War is described as the nature 
of armed violence where more than one thousand deaths result per year (Bloomfield et 
al 1998:10; Human Security Centre 2005: 18). Wars are a state of carnage that results 
from military aggression or counter-aggression between two states alternatively. War 
can be armed rebellion within a state where a rebel group and government forces engage 
each other without adequate protection for civilian population who are unarmed. The 
origin of war is itself a debate as whether it is innate with human or acquired. Hobbes 
(1904: 119, 120, 131) idea of the leviathan signified the elected leader of the state and 
his influence on the citizens. The citizen is though free, but is subject to the power of 
the prince. The idea enabled Hobbes to explain his belief in human as political creature 
who organise together with others to compete to survive. It has its foundation with the 
Aristotelian political model, 'man is by nature a political animal' (Hall 1973: 23). This 
perception carries the idea that politics means to organise and compete for power to 
acquire needs, scarce resources or economic resources, e.g. land, mineral and natural 
resource and distribute them within a particular state context (Mayer 2000: 66). The 
resources within a state context need to be protected from external threats. This 
perception made it necessary to have a state with central authority or leadership for the 
purpose of defence against external aggression and to maintain internal security. The 
collective trust has been essential with liberals' belief for security for private property. 
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This underlies the importance of the state taking over the function of protection and 
creation of enabling environment for citizens to generate wealth (Mbaku 1999: 300, 
317). In the view of Hobbes this makes it relevant for the need of political authority, 
thus, the "preservation of political authority will prevent aggression of all against all" 
(Hall 1973: 34). This belief also underlies the realist one-sided view of realpolitiks 
where "[p ]eace is not about justice; rather it is about effecting security" (Freedman 
2001: 311), whereby the state and its authority generally view instrumental security as 
military, economic, and political as relevant means to wield power and to pursue 
security. 
The doctrine of Hobbes views the state as relevant albeit an 'indispensable devil and 
unwanted angel'. This means that while the state has its own problems it offers its 
blessings to bestow upon those who are citizens. Hobbes and Rousseau considered the 
state as ' .... a response to the "inconveniences", "inadequacies" or downright "anarchy" 
of the state of nature, i.e. the condition that preceded the state' (Hoffman 1988: 30). In 
Africa the formation of states has carried such "inconveniences", "inadequacies" and 
"anarchy" (a reversal to Hobbes and Rousseau cherished idea of protective state). For 
instance, tyranny is the worst form of authority citizens may expect from state authority. 
The state is relevant for the collective galvanisation of societal authority, achieving 
formidable defence and organised form of order and balance of power among 
individuals (Hoffman 1988: 16). This has not materialised practically in Africa in over 
fifty years of independence. Indeed Africans have become excessively dependant on the 
state. That is not functionally conducive in contemporary political practice for both 
security and citizen welfare as security itself takes extended meaning and new relevance. 
The statism system has also evolved various kinds of political models from liberal 
democracy to communism. The evolution of political modelling has also taken its toll 
on the post-colonial African society, with the continuation of various political unrest and 
wars carried over from liberation struggle conflicts and the Cold War political 
ideological divide period. 
It is argued here that the background to the problems preventing peace is often 
attributed to the African colonial background and the post-independence political 
quagmire. Indeed, these are usually cited as the reason for conflict that leads to new 
wars on the continent. These backgrounds prepared unstable ground for conflicts that 
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could have been prevented by appropriate state policies after the post-colonial era 
(Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen 2000: 54; Gwartney and Lawson 2005: 29; Abdallah 
2001: 162; Harris and Lewis 1999: 32, 34). In Africa and Asia in particular, conflicts 
that trigger wars are known to be embedded in multifarious ethnic identities and 
political grievances that centres on both a lack of political power-sharing and economic 
distribution issues (Bloomfield et al 1998: 9). However, current debate on the causes of 
wars theorizes that identity issues in the 'grievance hypothesis' are a cover up for 
opportunity to plunder state resources through militant means (Collier 2001: 143, 144). 
What is the significance of this and how valid is this debate in particularly for Africa? 
This study argues that there have been numerous efforts to control recurrence of wars by 
both international and regional organisations effort such as the UN, European Union 
(EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Africa Union (AU) (which was 
formerly Organisation of Africa Union (OAU)). These have taken place in the form of 
peacekeeping interventions, political diplomacy and recent efforts at peacebuilding with 
some preventive diplomacy initiatives in conflict ridden countries. These efforts seem to 
be having a positive effect on the number and intensity of wars in Africa (Human 
Security Report 2005), but these effects will not be sustained if the underlying causes of 
war are not addressed politically and economically. 
Politically, democracy in practice differs from the ancient Greek origin of the idea 
which says democracy is the gathering of all qualified citizens of Athens for assembly, 
demos (Blackwell 2003: 3-6; Dunn 1993: 16, 17). Democracy in the modem era 
generally takes the form of representation, where segments of society are represented by 
an elected person. This is termed by Rousseau (1999) as "social contract" and varied 
institutional arrangements and multiple stakeholders as "polyarchy" by Dahl (1998: 94). 
Critics see the current representation and majoritarian democratic model as elitism. The 
critics argue the representative system of democracy is essentially a closed and elitist 
arrangement. Two interests compete, one being the government's interest, and other 
being the opposition. This facilitates the plurality of stakeholders in the political 
decision-making as advantage, but has tendency of creating political tension where 
government appears intolerant. In this case, effective democracy should have conflict 
resolution component at various social and institutional levels to ensure peace. These 
are some of the key conceptual concerns the dissertation explores in discussion of the 
new war debates. The rationale and objectives of this study are now presented. 
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1.2. Rationale and Objectives 
There are many theories of causes of civil wars in Africa. The on-going debate centres 
mostly on the validity of the hypothesis in the current global political system. The 
concern here is to re-examine how these theories practically link military expenditure 
(milex), and the impact on conflict prevention policy over the years under review. The 
hypothesis is that the tension between the greed and grievance theories as key debate 
focus should rather be complimentary because using conventional analytical framework 
three-level-analysis for testing theories, the two trajectories of war theories builds upon 
the strength of each other (Levy 2001). Both theories combine demand policy measures 
which have both national and international implications to reduce or stop armed 
conflicts. The intellectual benefit of harnessing the tension between the two theories to 
enhance optimal decision-making on conflict resolution policy with emphasis on milex 
reduction towards peacebuilding, a holistic and sustainable approach to conflict 
resolution, is explored here. 
The critical theoretical goals the research explored are the following, firstly, to examine 
the debate concerning the causes of war with particular reference to 'greed' and 
'grievance'; second, to review the major civil wars which have occurred in Sub-Saharan 
Africa since 1990, with particular reference to their underlying causes; and finally, to 
assesses the implications of the underlying causes of war for African military 
expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
1.3. Preliminary Literature Review 
1.3.1. Literature review on causes of war 
"The Causes of War" by Howard (2001) draws on the history of war presented by 
authors such as Thucydides to Vattel, Jomini, Wright, Brodie to Blaiey to show that 
wars are not contingent phenomena but crafted by statesmen with calculated intention to 
achieve good. In as much as war to others may seem animalistic due to the level number 
of human casualties, Howard says wars such as civil wars are state politics based on 
civilized principles. It the same time he concedes that actors in war's attitudes and 
perceptions pertaining to power and the state's security is bound up with underlying 
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factors of war (p. 32). His key examples are taken from European wars and former 
Soviet Union conflicts. He draws his concluding thoughts from the basis that war 
reflects previous ''underlying instability" (p. 36) He believes the issue of suspicion as 
typified in the cold war by Russia for Western hegemony and pursued state of balance, 
conversely made Russia a threat to Western interest. Suspicion legitimizes the 
consequence of war as the best policy option even though the cost involved may appear 
irrational from the perspective of idealist. Suspicion also legitimizes the arms race and 
military build-up as a deterrent to potential war. Howard focuses much on the interstate 
war of the West. The underlying principles of his argument such as rationalization of 
armed conflict, suspicion, policy positions, political actors' perception, and impact on 
arms race will assist in drawing conclusion for the state of conflict in Africa. Though 
Howard espouses ideals of realism where peace does not necessary mean devoid of 
armed belligerence, he tries to ward off the demonization of realist perception and 
position over war. 
In the "Theories of interstate and intrastate war: A levels-of-analysis approach", Levy 
(2001) shows the daunting task of reassessing some theories on causes of war based on 
the three levels-of-analysis framework. He modified the three levels-of-analysis by 
Waltz to test the validity of variables in causes of war theories. Levy's view is that good 
theories should be capable of multiple explanatory powers and be able to forecast war 
tendencies at both international and domestic levels. His reason based on his review of 
some of the theories is that they offer no definitive conclusions based on explanatory 
variable(s). The theories validity, Levy claims, do not match with particular analytical 
framework for systemic and domestic range. He provided another three level-of-
analysis models that take cognisance of the traditional systemic range, the societal range, 
and individual range. 
In the "Origin of war in Africa", Tshitereke (2003) acknowledges various underlying 
factors that trigger war in Africa. In drawing conclusions from globalization cum neo-
liberalism and the imported political systems that are in their infancy on the continent of 
Africa, he cites "identity, ethnicity and inequality", "natural resource endowment", and 
"on greed and grievance" as the main sources of violent conflicts. They are also fuelled 
by criminality for economic gain. The agents of this criminality he labelled international 
criminal enterprise. From this perspective Tshitereke points out that the wars in Africa 
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creates "parallel economy" where criminal agents take advantage to reap economic gain. 
On the reverse side are those who bear the brunt of criminal brutality and trauma of the 
war (pp. 81 - 82). It can be seen that the author tries not to elevate any particular factor 
as the key element, and this enable him to arrive at a conclusion that causes of African 
wars can be multifarious, but these factors are nonetheless exploited for criminal 
economic gains by combined actors of local and international origin. Tshitekere 
perspective holds much value for analysts of African wars because there are diverse 
sources of war but "inseparable" from crime as fuelling factor. The implication is that 
when conflict reaches fatigue level where conflict is bound to end naturally due to 
resource exhaustion, the interests of international criminal enterprise provide the outlet 
of supply which sustains the conflict and its economic exploitation. Tshitekere 
perspective shall contribute to the examination of the two main debates on the causes of 
African wars, particularized as greed and grievance. 
The article "Economic Cause of Civil Conflicts and Their Implications for Policy" by 
Collier (2001) sets the theory that civil wars in Africa have their source in "greed" and 
not "grievance" as most articles assert. Collier, an economist, develops his argument 
from the perspective that the underlying cause of war in Africa is criminality-to plunder 
state resources through rebellion by private individuals. The position of this theory 
debunks grievance theory that wars in Africa are caused by political and ethnic-religious 
issues which cause marginalized and minority groups to resort to violence to seek 
redress or solution. According to Collier, it is unlikely for grievance to be the underlying 
factor but he does not reject grievance as triggering factors. The author draws a clear 
distinction between triggering factors and underlying factor with the latter determined 
as the root source. With this distinction Collier categorizes the factors and situates greed 
more as an underlying rather than triggering factor. The implication, as the theory posits 
is that for a good conflict prevention policy to be effective, there is the need to 
recognize this distinction and formulate conflict prevention policy that captures greed as 
the key issue to deal with in the foremost. Collier's greed theory has become one of the 
key foci for testing this work given that a significant number of contemporary articles 
are influenced by his theory. The potential problem with greed theory is that it neglects 
to consider some civil wars as being caused by structural factors. 
The article "What do we know about natural resources and civil warT' (2004a) reviews 
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fourteen recent cross-national econometric studies, and many qualitative studies, which 
attempts to offer clarification on the ongoing debate on the causes of war and the 
relationship between natural resources and civil war. Ross (2004a: 351) argues that the 
trend of the debate in many of the recent studies is "ambiguous or contradictory" 
offering appropriate policy recommendations or contradictions. The reason, Ross argues, 
is that the causes of conflict can be complex and requires scholarly cooperation. Thus, 
sharing data, speaking common conceptual language, and drawing together the findings 
of research projects, contribute to better understanding the determinants of civil war. 
The article is critical of scholars not testing their ideas empirically. This argument 
identifies the strength of Ross argument that there cannot be a reason behind the causes 
of civil war without consideration of valid practical issues. 
1.3.2. Milex literature review 
The article by Suzuki (2007) "Major arms imports and the onset of civil and Ethnic 
wars in the postcolonial world, 1956-1998: A preliminary reassessment", studies the 
effects of states' major arms imports from major powers on the likelihood of civil and 
ethnic wars in the postcolonial world. Suzuki (2007) states that statistically major arms 
imported from major world states into developing states cannot be significantly linked 
to triggering civil war or ethnic war. However, the author has not debunked the fact that 
it invariably has degree of negative impact on causal issues of such wars (pp. 101, 106). 
Suzuki suspects that small arms and light weapons proliferation can have some causal 
link which was not the subject of this article by stating that, "[h]owever, these results 
reveal only one aspect of the links between arms imports and internal armed conflict" 
(pp. 108, l09). The usefulness of this article is that Suzuki has reviewed major literature 
on arms import and impact on internal conflict. He clarifies the distinction between civil 
war and ethnic war and employs models that take into consideration the systemic issues, 
state and individual actors involved in policy. The article supports that armament is 
significant for civil war deterrence. Suzuki did not assess the overriding strength of the 
state by arms build-up in Africa, which are used to sabotage constitutional authority. It 
ignores the morale of the army which evidences show, when degenerated can cause 
internal instability. 
The article by Harris (2004) "The case for demilitarisation in Sub-Saharan Africa" 
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pursues the rationale to reduce milex in discussing the need for demilitarisation in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Harris' argument is that demilitarisation is concurrent with reducing 
military spending by reducing the size of the army, and redefining the role of military 
for more cost effective and social benefits and reduction in force personnel (p.3). Harris 
therefore defines demilitarisation as "a process of working towards a society which 
emphasizes the non-violent resolution of contlicts and personal social justice". The 
author considers the levels of militarization since 1990s, and also determines potential 
benefits of militarization. This enables him to propose seven reasons for demilitarisation 
by taking into consideration these factors. These include the changed nature of warfare, 
the meaning of security that has changed, military expenditure retards economic growth 
and development, the negative effect of military on human rights, the ineffectiveness of 
the military in resolving contlict, among others. The end point as put forth by Harris is 
that "military can be transformed" by transforming the military by non-offensive 
defence, civilianising military functions, and social defence; secondly, reducing the 
incidence of disputes by befriending the neighbours, promoting democracy, and 
promoting development; and thirdly, building dispute-resolution capacity by educating 
in contlict resolution and management, and establishing contlict resolution institutions 
(p. 12). Harris argues finally for aid, investment and lending conditions that encourage 
demilitarization and substantive cutting on milex by states. 
In "Does military spending matter? Contlict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989 - 1999", 
Smaldone's (2004) analyses the patterns of war, peace and military spending from the 
1990s across forty-two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The gist of the literature 
critically examines whether military expenditure (ME), military burden (ME/CGE), 
military capability (MEl AF), and a composite military effort index (MEl) has something 
to do with the incidences of major armed contlicts and their durations. His findings 
showed that tendency to war is not intluenced by military expenditure (ME), military 
capability (ME/AF), and a composite military effort index (MEl). Rather the states with 
significant military burden (ME/CGE) are those that have major armed contlict. The 
military burden (ME/CGE) exposes states to the tendency towards high milex. 
Therefore the implication is that low military spending also exposes a state to threat of 
war. This couples with other factors to trigger contlict. The relevance of the findings is 
that it did acknowledge other factors as necessary to combine with low spending to 
trigger wars and this will help in identifying the other factors. The overall policy impact 
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is development regression. 
In "Military expenditure and conflict in Africa", Omitoogun (2001), raises the inevitable 
limitations of military expenditure data. She states "to use military expenditure to 
measure phenomena other than the economic burden constituted by high defence 
spending is fraught with a lot of weaknesses". The author considers military expenditure 
as inadequate to assess the phenomena of armed conflicts. He however emphasise 
"economic hardship" which implies grievance as the causal basis for civil rebellion that 
leads to armed conflict. In justifying the argument of the weakness of military 
expenditure as a key issue, the author cites factors like lack of data, deficiency due to 
unreliability of available data as a result of various kinds of manipulation, poor 
accounting systems and verification problems, and the problem of conversion of data 
into dollars currency from local one has it own limitations. The significance, as raised 
by the author, is that it makes the military expenditure records available difficult for use 
to predict its conclusive roles in conflict making. Hence, indirect role cannot be ruled 
out but argues that military spending in terms of wages can be interpreted as reducing 
unemployment. But with regard to it crowding out other social services like education, 
health and others which could serve as triggering factors in social rebellion, is 
inconclusive. The explanation is that other factors have to combine with high military 
expenditure to trigger social uprising. The relevance of this literature is that it exposes 
the weaknesses which arguments based on milex in Africa need to consider and cautions 
against over emphasis on them in debates on causes of wars in Africa . 
. In "Data issues in the study of conflict", Collier and Hoeffier (2001), review and discuss 
issues concerning data on civil wars. The authors state that definition of war determines 
what data to collect. Therefore the narrow scope of a definition certainly affects the 
findings of research due to scope of data used. Collier and Hoeffier argue that some 
definitions explicate the underlying issues of conflict but are not based on the severity 
of violence, for example, the Kosimo databank. They recommend the need to conform 
to data categorisation that is of broader scope and offers varied forms of definitions of 
war at the choice of the user of such data. The authors believe that the best definition 
should consider the level of violence as a measuring scale rather than other factors. This 
argument is based on the fact that definitions that emphasise factors other than level of 
violence only serve the interest of rebels and their goals. 
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In examining the correlation between military expenditure and economic growth in less 
developed countries (LCD), Deger and Smith (1983), gathered empirical facts, cross-
sectional in a macro-statistical framework. They stated that analysis should not be 
complex but could use a simple model framework. What is useful in this literature is 
that the arena of milex influence is categorised into four areas. Firstly, resource 
allocation and mobilisation, secondly, organisation of production, thirdly, socio-political 
structure, and lastly, external relations. This simplifies any analysis and makes assessing 
the impact of milex both easier and more common sensical. 
Looney (1988) attempted to examine the extent of military expenditure impact on the 
poverty condition that has started worsening in Africa in the 1970s into 1980s. Looney 
claims, importantly for this study, that high military spending at that time had less 
impact on education and health but could have affected economic services and roads. To 
be more specific Looney's view could imply that non-conflict states milex has less 
impact on their development budget; whilst major conflict states has serious impact 
with milex on their development budget because they do not have external sources for 
grants and loans. The donor sources do not provide funds in conflict period or high 
tendency. The article provides a good background to the impact of the debate on the 
causes of wars in Africa since 1990s. It provides a background to the current debate 
which centres on war, economics and social welfare with clear distinction between non-
conflict countries and major conflict ones in Africa. 
1.4. Research Approach 
1.4.1. Defmition of analytical framework 
Finding an appropriate framework for causes of wars analysis is difficult due to their 
complexity. This has generated debates and models that particularize analysis, taking a 
reductionist approach. The reductionist approach limits the analysis to the impact of 
pattern of structures rather than behaviour of actors (Waltz 1979: 18, 19, 36). The nature 
of new Sub-Saharan African wars in particular makes it even more difficult to locate 
model of analysis. Waltz formulated the system approach after critiquing the traditional 
IR reductionist approach which disaggregates national structure into its units such as 
political, economic, socio-cultural organization and ethnicity. Waltz describes the 
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reductionist framework as incapable of assessing behaviour, but rather impact of 
organizational structure not the effect of activities by actors. He critiques its inability to 
capture the effects of state interaction with the international (systemic) role. Waltz 
formulated the system approach which composed of both national and systemic 
structures which analyze the relational interaction of actors in the two spheres as a 
system. The model's two structures are inadequate to analyze the complex scope and 
nature of new civil wars in Africa. 
Levy (2001: 4ft) adapted the system model of Waltz by introducing what he describes as 
the levels-of-analysis framework. This model adds an additional level to Waltz' two 
system structure. Levy's concern is that knowing the 'how' of the levels (or structures) 
of interacting factors in a system requires ability to assess individual actor's behaviour 
and perceptions. Whilst it will be too much additional task in this work to use 
psychology tools to conduct individual actors assessment, creating structures helps to 
identify individuals and their behaviour in one or more structures and it political 
consequence. Apart from the individual actor as dependent variable, there are two other 
structures in levels-of-analysis framework. The national level has governmental 
variables as domestic political system structure, policymaking process, political culture 
and ideology, societal and economic structures, among others. The systemic level also 
has variables as global anarchic structure, the major powers involved in the global 
system, military distribution, pattern of military alliances and international trade. 
To understand the phases of Levy's framework requires better understanding of the term 
'structure'. The word has scientific origins implying the interaction between levels of 
systems to deliver consistent output. The adoption of structure in the social science 
arena has given it broader usage. Its implication in general connotes the levelling of 
outcomes within interaction of systems. In this case, it could be accepted that the 
interaction within a particular unit alone is not suffice in justifying the validity of a 
theory unless all other systems that fit into configuration are considered. A system is 
therefore a "set of interacting units" (Waltz 1979: 40, 80). This makes Levy's levels-of-
analysis model suitable framework to review the grievance and greed theories. 
The levels-of-analysis model shall also be adapted here by inserting the "regional" 
structure from Brown (2001: 213) to form integrative-analysis-system framework. The 
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regional structure as independent variable captures the essential role and "motivation" 
of key background political actors within a region in making civil wars in other states 
happens. As Brown also perceives wars as deliberate rational human activity, the 
integrative-analysis-system will enable the study of the theories under consideration for 
their validity in integrative and comprehensive manner. A theory is describes as a 
logical explanation born out of hypothesis or an idea (Waltz 1979: 5). It is therefore 
scientific, because it depends on empirical evidence or data; and genius creativity as art, 
because it requires imagination to invent out of what is seen or observed. A hypothesis 
is just imagination and once empirically confirmed, it becomes a theory (Waltz 1979: 7, 
8). There are strong and weak theories and for this reason a theory must be tested over 
time to justify their validity. In this case theories are transient, or as Waltz (1979: 5) 
describes, and do not constitute "edifice of truth" neither "reproduction of reality". So 
from a new observation of existing phenomenon a better theory can emerge to phase out 
existing one. But the laws that theories seek to explain are permanent and do not have 
qualitative value but quantitative. 
With this perspective, Levy's model can help in assessing the impact of diverse actors' 
behaviours and structural influences over Sub-Saharan African countries new wars. The 
Levy's model will also enable reviewing the grievance and greed hypothesis impact on 
milex in Africa and the effect on state political stability and peace. In Levy's application 
the focus was more on testing the causal factors theory of inter-state wars. But he stated 
that the model can be applied to intra-state wars. To make it effective for the task in this 
study, levy's model is slightly modified to enhance its capacity on gauging behaviour 
variation of different entities such as international, state, and non-state political actors. 
As an integrative system, it is versatile to examine multiple issues and actors involved 
in intra-state war in particular. It is useful adapting the levels-of-analysis model into 
integrative-analysis-system in this instance, because the African civil wars have diverse 
and complicated causal factors. The regional context inserted has prominent role in 
current dynamics of conflict in Africa as will emerge in the study. 
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1.4.2. Methodology 
The research is mainly quantitative which implies that non-numerical data or nominal 
scales and to some extent numerical data shall be used to determine behavioural patterns. 
The research derived its data from non-empirical literature sources of journals, articles, 
books and dissertations mainly in the domain of peace studies, conflict resolution, and 
international relations. 
The constraint posed by literature review research is that there was no access to primary 
data. However, the risk is minimal because of the reliable nature of sources such as 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which identifies each 
individual exporter and importer, and converts arms transfers figure into millions of 
constant 1990 U.S. dollars since 1950 (Suzuki 2007: 109); World Military Expenditure 
and Arms Transfer (WMEAT) which contains all arms transfers (major weapons and 
small and light weapons) from major powers as well as minor ones to individual states 
(Suzuki 2007: 107); and Human Security Reports which presents annual human 
security data that describes the complex of interrelated threats associated with civil war, 
genocide and the displacement of populations (Human Security Report 2005: VIII). 
With the milex data it is an acceptable fact by scholars that the data available from 
many states especially those from the developing countries may not reflect the needed 
accuracy due to high secrecy in some of milex dealings (Harris 2004: 205). However, 
available data was used to present the best possible picture of military spending pattern. 
Any limitation imposed by this nature of rnilex records inevitably affected the analysis 
but within generally acceptable norm with the use of milex data. I also acknowledge 
that there are some literature used that were without page numbering. In such instance 
the reference only quoted the author and the year of the article in this dissertation. 
The entire dissertation follow this outline starting with Chapter one which introduced 
the dissertation with regard to background issues, aim and objectives. It also provided 
sample literature review of causes of new civil wars and military expenditure (milex). It 
spelled the analytical framework and provided procedure to accomplish the research 
study, and also an outline of chapters. Chapter two reviewed the trend of military 
expenditure in SSA since 1990. It set out with introduction, a glance over pre-colonial 
SSA conflict context, and reviewed the recent trend of global wars and SSA milex data. 
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The chapter discussed the influences on milex decisions, the effect of milex, and it expl 
ored alternative to reliance on military defence, reviewed the new trend in security 
approach, and a summary. 
Chapter three discussed the "grievance" or "greed and grievance" debate as the causes 
of wars in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990. The discussion began with and introduction. 
It set out the discussion with grievance debate from political perspective and considers 
subjects as immature democratic process, fragmentation of nation-state in globalisation, 
constitution tampering, the greed discourse, and a summary. Chapter four reviewed the 
major intra-state wars in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 and underlying issues with 
introduction and continues to examine civil wars in SSA from Economic Community of 
West Africa (ECOWAS) conflicts, Central and East Africa (Great Lake Region) and 
Southern Africa sub-regions, and a summary. 
Chapter five provided an evaluation and policy implications of the causes of war 
debates and impact on military spending in SSA. With an introduction the chapter 
evaluate SSA conflicts profile, it continue to evaluate the "greed and grievance" and 
implications for military priority, grievance and impact on human development, and 
ends with summary. The final chapter six provided a summary of central ideas of the 
chapters, a concluding reflection and suggest some recommendations as policy guide. 
The dissertation ends with a section on literature resource reference and appendices. 
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Chapter Two 
Military expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) defines milex as "an input 
measure: they measure the amount of resources used for military purposes. They are 
therefore best used as an indicator of the economic burden imposed by military 
activities" (Omitoogun 2001). Perez-Lopez (1996: 125) defines milex as "all the 
material and human resources devoted by a state to its defence, and intended to, (i) 
guarantee its national independence, the integrity of its territory and, where appropriate, 
the respect of the international treaties binding the country to foreign states; and (ii) 
maintain internal security and public order". Collier and Hoeffler (2001: 10) describe 
milex as "Military expenditures [which] measure the cost of maintaining a military 
establishment in war and peace. .. Military expenditures are an input measure, the 
aggregation of payments for military personnel and equipment. In this dissertation the 
sources of mile x data are SIPRI, UPPSALA University of the Netherlands, International 
Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), and the U.S. Department of State world Military 
Exports and Transfers (WMEAT) (see appendix item 6) series. These sources are well 
known and reliable for operational and maintenance defence cost. They acknowledge 
the scanty information on procurement, especially, during the period of conflict in 
warring states. This dissertation therefore, in the use of such data, has limitations for the 
scope of the data used. In this chapter a review of the recent trends of global wars is 
offered. It continues with an examination of the Sub-Saharan Africa milex data, a 
review influences on milex decisions, a look at the effect of milex, a new trend in 
security approaches, alternatives to reliance on military defence are considered, and 
finally a summary of the issues is offered. 
2.1.Recent trend of global wars 
The trend of world wide wars shows that the civilian casualties and victims in armed 
conflicts have increased since the First World War, from five percent to fifty percent, 
during the Second World War, to eighty percent in the 1990s (Bloomfield et al 1998: 14). 
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The vast majority of these, according to the Human Security Report (2005: 127 - 140), 
were the result of war-related famine and disruption to the provision of health services. 
Beside human casualties, the consequence of wars since the World Wars has shown 
significant devastation of property and infrastructure. This reality of war makes it an 
activity that is grossly inimical to human development. Wars cause massive damage to 
the ecology due to the sophisticated nature of weapons used (Human Security Centre 
2005: 30). There are cases of deliberate destruction of the ecological diversities where, 
fighting forces and refugees hiding in the bush are compelled to depend on wild animals 
for survival (Brauer 2000: 32). 
Other negative effects of wars are felt in the health sector where breakdown of activities, 
especially provision of health services causes fatal disease outbreaks such as cholera 
and dysentery. Also, there occur disruption of disease eradication programmes such as 
those fighting Polio and Guinea Worm. Currently, the massive gathering of refugees 
without work has given way to women prostituting themselves for survival. This has 
been reported to have increased the spread of HIV in many conflict areas and where 
refugees tend to concentrate. Post-conflict control of disease spread such as HIV/AIDS 
has not been easy in places like Liberia where government focus is centred on stability 
and security issues (UNAIDS 2007; Human Security Centre 2006: 130) 
During war time, there normally results cessation of economic activities which deprive 
the state and the active citizen of the means to generate income and revenue collection 
(Tshitereke 2003: 83, 84). Since the state depends on revenues the longer a war lasts, it 
becomes detrimental to the economy of the state and local business. As a result of 15 
years of civil war in Liberia, unemployment is estimated at eighty to eighty-five percent 
of the population with same figure living under the poverty line due to little or minimal 
economic activity even after the new democratic government of lohnson-Sirleaf 
(FAO/WEP 2000; McIntosh 2006: 1, 11). 
Socio-culturally, wars present social cohesion and families become fractured. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, is a well resourced country but due 
to unceasing armed conflict many communities cannot organize themselves for 
development. Burundi and Rwanda still have many refuges scattered in the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC) region. Most of the skilled labour that could 
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contribute enormously to Rwanda's reconstruction are living as refuges in neighbouring 
countries. Indeed Africa requires a significant reduction of the incidents of wars to 
accelerate development and economic growth (Human Security Centre 2005: 130). 
Politically, there is also the idea that particular political models are the root cause of 
civil/intra-state conflict. The evidence from the International Relations discipline on 
conflict and peace shows that in most places, early stages of democratization has in fact 
caused conflict and related destabilization activities. This is contrary to the expectation 
of stability and peace (Mansfield and Snyder 2001: 113). There is also the evidence that 
post-war political system if properly handled could provide stability by adopting a more 
inclusive political system, a rule of law, and transparency in governance. This is the 
stage in which many African countries currently situated. Thus a reduction in inter-state 
and intra-state wars is apparent. Many Sub-Saharan African states need for dire external 
aid have realign their governance system towards transparency and participatory 
reforms. For instance, the African initiative with the introduction of African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) through the New Partnership for Africa Development 
(NEPAD), is also contributing to proper 'conflict reducing' governance in few countries 
that are signatory. 
The sudden upsurge in the incidence of conflict, especially in Africa has been attributed 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 'thawing' of the Cold War. The Cold War era 
(which followed the Second World War), was the belligerent tension between USA and 
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and the Soviet and Eastern Bloc 
states. The accumulating uneasy calmness resulted in the incidence of more inter-state 
conflicts. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its disintegration into nation-states 
began another tum of recurrent conflicts in breakaway former Soviet states and the 
already polarized SSA. The period after 1990 saw Africa also going through a period of 
armed intra-state wars in for example Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan, 
DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, Algeria and Morocco and Western Sahara region. In 
Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia and East Timor; and across to Central America, Peru, 
Columbia had also been in conflict (See appendix for graph). In Africa though there was 
an observed fall in the number of conflicts from 1991 to 1996. After this period there 
was another upwards rise from three in 1996 to eleven by 1999 (Sollenberg and 
Wallensteen 2001: 53). However, a decline was again experienced from 2002 through 
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2003 by ten percent (Human Security Center 2005: 65-67). In 2003, despite the reported 
world-wide decline, the level of political violence experienced in Africa and Asia 
remained comparatively high even though Africa's level showed twenty percent 
decrease with Asia showing a four percent increase. In the sample of figures below, 
there is a general reduction by five inter-state wars in 2003 from 2002 was experienced; 
and only one reduction in intra-state wars. The last figures are high in Africa, keeping 
the region at the top of the table in terms of armed conflicts. Asia had two increases in 
inter-state but reduction in intra-state conflicts by three remained second to Africa as a 
conflict prone zone. The Middle-East showed increase in inter-state wars based conflict 
but did not experience any intra-state conflict. 
Table 1. Regional distribution, number and types of major armed conflicts: 1990-2000 
Region 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
G GT G T G T G T 
T 
Africa 8 3 8 3 6 1 6 5 1 
1 
America, 
Central 4 - 4 - 3 - 3 - 3 -
and South 
Asia 4 9 3 8 4 4 4 6 
8 6 
Europe - - - 1 - 3 - 5 - 4 
Middle 1 3 2 4 2 3 2 4 2 4 
East 
Total 1715 17 15 15 14 
16 15 16 15 
Total 32 33 30 31 29 
G = government and T = territory, the two types of incompatibility 
Project. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
G T G T G T G T G T G T 
4 1 2 1 4 - 10 10 1 8 1 
1 
3 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 -
4 4 3 3 2 2 7 
7 6 6 6 7 
- 3 - 1 - - - 1 - 2 - 1 
2 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
13 11 12 11 8 17 15 14 11 
15 10 12 
28 23 19 27 27 25 
Source: The Uppsa/a Conflict Data 
Table 2. Cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence: 2002 - 2003 
State-based No ....... te One-sided Total: AU types 
2002 2003 Chaneed 2002 2003 ChanRed 2002 2003 Chaneed 2002 2003 ChaDftd 
Africa 13 9 -4 8 7 -1 11 9 -2 18 13 -s 
Americas 2 1 -1 2 2 0 1 1 0 3 2 -1 
Asia 6 8 +2 3 1 -2 5 5 0 7 9 +2 
Europe 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Middle 2 3 +1 1 1 0 4 4 +3 3 4 +1 
East 
Total 24 22 -2 14 11 -3 20 19 +1 32 29 -3 
Source: Uppsa/alHuman Security Report 2005 
Beyond and within the period of 2002 to 2003, Africa has experienced higher migration 
of professionals and skilled labour to the West and the Middle-East. The high rate of loss 
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of health care staff indicates a deterioration of general health care. Education sector, too, 
has not shown any remarkable improvement in enrolment in schools. Food production has 
not improved generally with famine cases experienced within all the sub-regions in Africa, 
e.g., Niger, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, DR Congo, Sudan, Somalia. Salaries in many 
African countries cannot adequately meet daily needs. Research has shown that much of 
the human suffering is due to failure of the state as a result of improper policies that create 
debt, prevent government service delivery and promote other internal conflict issues like 
ethnic and identity issues (Abdallah 2001: 157; Tshitereke 2003: 85). 
2.2. Sub-Saharan Africa milex data 
The available information on Sub-Saharan African milex IS considered by many 
researchers as barely representative. In many African states milex comes foremost in 
consideration of national budget. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 8) SSA level 
of mile x is, 
[i]n response to the high risk of civil war, African governments increase their 
military spending. Spending is particularly high in post-conflict situations, 
partly because risks of further conflict are very high, but also because of inertia 
from the inherited high spending during war. African military spending is also 
increased by emulation and rivalry among neighbours, and by aid: around 11 
per cent of development aid inadvertently leaks into military spending so that in 
Africa around 40 per cent of spending is financed by aid. African governments 
respond to a high risk of coups in the same way as to a high risk of rebellion: 
military spending is increased. 
This picture reflects much of the increase pattern of African milex since 1990. Available 
data estimates indicate that pre-1990 Africa spent less on milex which took 
comparatively small portion of GDP (Landau 1993: 2). Some factors such as low level 
conflicts and generally weak economies have contributed to less milex in most African 
states. Many of the African states already have high outstanding debts due to the 1970s 
Crude Oil high cost shock. And Landau (1993: 12) has also indicated that results from 
regions other than Africa shows the effect of milex on growth depend on the allocation 
within GDP of between four percent and nine percent. It is evident in data presented 
below that after 1990, with new conflicts era in Africa increasing milex and economic 
growth has shown considerable decline. Skons (2000) confirms that seventy-one percent 
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of forty African countries indicate a link between high milex and the occurrence of war. 
The period after the Cold War collapse and the new wars in Africa has resulted in 
consistent progression of milex. WMEAT records confirm that of the twenty-five top 
military spenders in Africa, with the exception of Botswana and Tunisia, the rest of the 
states are directly or indirectly involved in conflict. WMEAT data of 1999 - 2000 show 
DRC has a defence budget of 14.4% whilst in 2003 - 2004 defence spending rose to 
21.7% of GDP. The sharp rise can be explained as the security consolidation by the then 
new military government under Kabila. Eritrea, a small country with small economy 
accounted for defence spending of 27.4% by 2000. This declined to sixteen percent by 
2004. Eritrea had clashed with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, over a border dispute. A 
settlement for cease-fire was reached and agreement on Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) 
with Ethiopia in Algiers in 2000. This explained the cut down in milex after that period. 
The hostility however resumed in 2005. Angola estimates defence spending of 21.2% 
of the GDP by 2000, due largely to a breakdown of the Lusaka Peace Accord in 1998 
which sent UNITA and government back to war (Human Rights Watch 2003b; also 
appendix item 5). In 2003 the milex declined to 8.5% because of the relative stability 
experienced in 2003 (Porto 2004: 3; also appendix item 4). Human Rights Watch 
revealed the government suppressed data on arms purchases from 1998 as funds were 
diverted from social and development support budgets. 
Table 3. World and regional military expenditure estimates 1996 - 2005 (Africa portion of 
data) 
Change 
Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 96-05 
Africa 8.6 8.7 9.4 10.5 11.1 11.1 12.1 11.9 12.6 12.7 +48 
North 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.6 5.5 +58 
Sub-Saharan 5.1 5.0 5.6 6.6 6.8 6.6 7.3 6.9 (7.0) (7.2) +42 
World 747 756 748 757 784 800 851 914 969 IDOl +34 
Change(%) 1.3 -1.1 1.2 3.6 2.0 6.4 7.5 5.9 3.4 
Figures are in US$ b., at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages. 
Figures do not always add up to totals because of the convention of rounding. 
( ) = Total based on country data accounting for less than 90% the regional total; 
.. = Available data account for less than 60% of the regional total. 
Some countries are excluded because of lack of data or consistent time series data. Africa excludes 
Angola, Benin, Equitorial Guinea and Somalia. (See appendix item 2 for full table) 
Source: SIPRl Year Book 2006 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) (Appendix 8A, tables SA. I and SA.3). 
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Table 4. The largest military spenders in Mrica 
Bil.S Growth rate {%} Growth rate {%} 
1999 
89-99 95-99 Bil.S 89-99 95-99 
1999 
Southern Mrica 11.0 0.5 16.2 Morocco 1.5 -0.1 3.6 
Congo (Kinshasa) 5.2 13.1 47.0 Tunisia .3 -0.3 2.3 
Angola 2.5 0.5 4.9 Central Mrica 4.0 1.2 18.2 
South Mrica 2.0 -8.5 -8.6 Nigeria 1.6 -1.9 26.8 
Zimbabwe .3 1.8 11.4 Ethiopia .5 -4.8 50.4 
Botswana .2 4.9 9.5 Sudan .4 4.7 -1.8 
North Mrica 6.0 1.9 8.4 Eritrea .2 18.6 
Libya NA -1.6 5.1 Kenya .2 -2.6 0.3 
Algeria 1.8 9.2 11.3 
Source: WMEAT 2002 
Several other factors influence high milex such as political leadership, state record of 
war or armed violence, donor condition and regional neighbourhood or circumstance. 
These factors will be discussed in the next section but we shall consider here the issue 
of defence policy and milex. Omitoogun (2002: 12 - 14) discusses the problem with 
"absence of a defence policy to guide the budgeting and planning" therefore create 
"distortions" in the general economic policy. This is attributed to either a lack of 
expertise or proper administrative environment, or sometimes both. This makes it 
difficult to determine what is being spent, by whom and on what. Ghana and Nigeria 
are cited by Omitoogun as examples where a lack of political coordination between the 
defense and other public sectors exists. This makes it even difficult for the defence 
budget to fall under legislative monitoring. Omitoogun further explains that many of the 
countries in Africa lack policy expertise who understands military spending. Whilst 
there is no convincing explanation for a lack of rational policy on defence as a policy 
issue by many African states, South Africa is a notable exception as one of the few key 
countries on the continent with well laid out defense policy. The importance of a 
defence policy is to provide a framework for military spending capable of preventing 
excesses of spending and promote accountability. This also contributes to a better 
administration of the defence budget. 
2.3. Influences on milex decisions 
By far the most important influences are the presence or threat of wars and ability to 
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afford milex. On an international level, milex in Sub-Saharan Africa benefits certain 
actors in particular. The key factor is profit through arms trade into the African region. 
In the wake of a civil war the international community is not exempted from the cost of 
refugees' influx and the associated problems, as well as involvement in state 
reconstruction from the devastation of war. The United Nations and Western countries 
appear to be fatigued by constant resource provision involved in peace-keeping and 
demobilization. However, arms trade through proper formal channels, informal and 
conflict entrepreneurs (underhand dealers) derive greater benefits from prolonged 
supply of ammunition (Francis 2004: 64). Tambudzai's (2005: 8) economic study 
confirmed that, 
[m ]ilex also depends on the actions of external weapons suppliers and donors of 
military aid. Arms production is a positive determinant of military expenditure 
and superpowers influence non-arms producing countries in terms of their 
purchases. 
In some cases, the level of gains has resulted in corrupt practices among state officials 
and arms manufacturing companies. For instance, in South Africa a government arms 
procurement probe with alleged high state officials and foreign companies in EU is the 
source of on-going investigations in South Africa and Germany. Some EU states have 
policies that protect arms companies and encourage the use of bribery to win 
procurement bids overseas (Roeber 2005: 9 - 13; Godbaw and Richards 1998: 230, 
238). So at the international level we find that arms trade to Africa is generating huge 
profit which sometimes involves a barter with natural resources. According to 
Omitoogun (2001: 295), Angola's own internal and involvement in neighbouring DRC 
conflicts accrued "an external debt burden of $11 billion and depressed world oil prices 
from 1998, in 1999 the country resorted to mortgaging its future oil sales to pay for 
military equipment". In this case Angola has to depend on external loans which are 
likely to frustrate its development efforts and, again, possibly create political instability 
(Masiga, Nakimbugwe, and Rwakabaale, 2005: 3). 
The persistence of political insecurity demands more spending on arms, than providing 
good health care and good schools (UNDP 1997; See also appendix item 6 for data). 
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The international system and structure with distrust of US hegemony also compels even 
smaller states to spend on armament. Cuba and states in Latin America with socialist 
orientation all resort to rely on strengthening their military capability as deterrent of any 
Western imperialism. According to Jorge F. Perez-Lopez (1996), Cuba's milex were 
"784 million pesos (8.6 percent of central government expenditure (CGE)) in 1978; they 
peaked at 1471 million pesos (3 percent percent of CGE) in 1985, and reached 1380 
million pesos (9.6 percent ofCGE) in 1990". In the 1990s milex took five percent of the 
GNP of Cuba. Smaldone (2004) argues that military capability or strength do not 
constitute genuine ability to control internal security, or external aggression. Developing 
countries tend to look to maximize their military capability as a deterrent to internal 
insurrection and external aggression. Because of the over dependence on military 
security system "arms suppliers can intluence governments to purchase military 
weapons well in excess of need" (Tambudzai 2005: 8). Uzodike (1996: 75) indicate that 
between 1991 and 1995 the American government alone supplied $311 million small-
weapons to forty-two states in Africa. Within the same period African debt stood at 
$300 billion (lhonvbere 1999: 48). What the two authors clearly point out is that arms 
suppliers exert pressure on African government which is against the optimal interest of 
the state. Excessive spending on defence leads to significant external debt. This 
indicates the role of the international system in developing countries' milex which has 
the potential to encourage a violation of human rights due to the over-confidence of 
some African leaders in increasing military arsenal. Mugabe's government in the wake 
of social discontent due to degenerating social and economic conditions resorted to 
further new arms importation between 2003 and 2005 from China (Tambudzai 2005 : 6). 
2.4. The effects of milex 
Much literature on milex in Africa does not recognize the link of high or low milex as 
direct source of armed contlict in states. However, some are of the view that milex 
(either high or low) has some impact on social expenditure by the state. If this is 
negative in the sense that it can cause reduction of the budget allocation to the social 
sector, it could indirectly serve as a trigger for violent contlict due to the 
disproportionate allocation of resources in the state that could violate the security of 
opposition and vulnerable groups (Samldone 2004). For example, in Ghana soldiers 
from disgruntled ethnic groups such as Ewes and Northerners tend to participate 
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actively in military coups (Brown 1983: 439, 442, 443). In this instance, state defence 
resources were used to overthrow constitutional governments from Nkrumah to Busia, 
and junior rank insurrection that brought Rawlings to power in Ghana for almost two 
decades. In Uganda, Amin overthrew the Obote government and instead of dealing with 
the development of the country, used the Army to terrorize his own country people. 
Amin focused on the security of his terrorist rule which served to pauperise Uganda and 
prepare Uganda for subsequent conflicts. According to Omitoogun (2001), 
In many African countries where there is an acute shortage of resources, 
devoting a proportionate share of state resources to defence may have a 
crowding out effect on social spending which may in turn adversely affect the 
well being of the citizens. This may trigger a reaction from the populace that 
could result in armed rebellion against the state. 
In this assertion, Omitoogun emphasizes that certainly other incendiary factors also 
contribute to the volatile situation created by economic marginalization and pressures 
thereof (See also Ali and Galbraith 2003: 14, 15). But in these assertions what is made 
obvious is that most African countries do not reveal data of their arm imports. The data 
available primarily pertain to military personnel and maintenance expenditure. However, 
valid milex data should determine the various segments that budget is used. Many such 
details pertaining to hardware are unavailable. But this does not negate the need for 
countries to increase their arsenal capability in case of a possible threat of internal or 
external insecurity. Smaldone (2004) noted that this has been the case for Africa since 
the 1990s. It was this period that many African countries were experiencing economic 
turmoil due to economic failures caused by what many believed to be inappropriate 
programmes such as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). This dissertation 
assumes that milex has a key role to play in conflicts in African wars (those either on-
going or ended). What therefore is important is why milex becomes an issue of security 
in SSA and what the sources of influence are? This will be assessed further within at the 
regional, national, and individual political level. 
At the African regional and sub-regional level, increased milex does not provide 
positive results in the political and social environment but rather that of suspicion of 
military threat among states, as security dilemma (Holsti 1995: 5). A case example is 
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Liberia's threat through Charles Taylor in the ECOWAS sub-region by exporting rebels 
and weapons into neighbouring states (Human Right Watch 2003: 11,29). Omitoogun 
(2001) mentioned that an increase in a state milex poses suspicion of military threat in 
the regional or sub-regional security. In Sub-Sahara Africa there is considerable 
confidentiality over milex, however an observed increase in budget allocation in that 
sector has the tendency to promote regional suspicion and insecurity. Harris (2004: 7) 
argues that high milex can be a disincentive to investors who will suspect the likelihood 
of military coup d'etat, which is common in Africa. But others also argue increased 
milex as sign of investors' confidence. Looney (1988: 322 - 325) has argued that states 
in a conflict period may not benefit from increasing military burden as it impact other 
social sectors; ironically, non-conflict states milex burden is not likely to impact the 
social sector. The empirical evidence shows that milex providing a sense of stability 
reduces economic growth in the long-term (Harris 2004: 7). 
At the national or state level the consequence of high milex budget cannot be 
overemphasized. Statistically, it is difficult to determine the level of procurement 
figures due to the secrecy of that part of defence spending. There is, however evidence 
that giving military procurement, operational and maintenance defence takes a greater 
portion of the CGE which creates a military burden for many developing countries, 
whether in conflict or not. This creates unsustainable external debt. The level of milex 
allocation can affect the overall state commitment to provision of its portion of 
development funds (Omitoogun 2003; Smaldone 2004). The visible part of rnilex 
budget, which is the operation cost in salaries to soldiers, is itself burdensome for 
developing countries. The recent preliminary studies by Suzuki (2007: 107 - 109) 
confirms possible "negative" impact of high milex, though it is statistically insignificant. 
Suzuki agrees that small arms and light weapons have a link to inception of civil wars 
but this is statistically unquantifiable and lacks empirical evidence. The secrecy over 
military procurements has contributed to the accuracy in using figures to estimate milex 
impact in relation to development regression. Practically, military investment does not 
yield direct dividend and so are a drain on developing states' economy. Harris (2004: 7) 
emphasizes that there is no direct return in such investment in military personnel. If a 
portion of the milex budget is invested in education and other productive areas of the 
economy, it will yield a dividend that has a direct impact on the general economy of the 
state. Excessive milex in pre-conflict, conflict period or post-conflict period will impact 
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on the level of government commitment to social service delivery (Agbese 1999: 232). 
The question then is does white elephant defence sector merit the cost involved that 
continue to over burden poor citizens? 
Mbaku (1999: 317) has stated that a "[p ]rotective state is one, which provides society 
with an enabling environment for the creation of the wealth needed to effectively 
confront poverty and deprivation". Conversely, a state's diversion of state agenda from 
optimal wellbeing of its citizens is inimical to political stability. In South Africa the 
post-apartheid policy resulting in a cut in milex resulted in the release of funds for other 
sectors in urgent need of funding. Batchelor, Dunne, and Lamb (2002: 346) indicate that, 
It is evident. .. that the main beneficiaries of the decline in defence spending 
since 1989/90 have been social services (e.g. education, health, social security 
and welfare) and public order and safety (police, justice and correctional 
services). The increases in education, health and social security and welfare 
reflect the prioritization of social spending, particularly since 1994 when the 
ANC came to power. 
The key note of concern is the emphasis placed on how the government determined its 
priorities over maintaining the level of milex that preceded the ANC, though the defence 
budget had already declined by that time, due to the collapse of Soviet Union, which 
reduced the level of ideological threat and security in the SADC zone. The new South 
African government saw earlier on the need to reshuffle its priorities away from defence. 
But that would have been critical considering the nature of the transitional period which 
could have threatened political stability. Uzoigwe (1975: 472) contends that militarism, 
irrespective of historical placement (pre or post-colonial), has "repercussions on 
political, social, and economic relations". Therefore why do African states continue to 
consider the pattern of prioritizing high milex above other security issues in state 
expenditure? 
2.5. New trends in security provision 
The slow pace of development and growth still creates internal security dilemma in 
many African states. The internal stability is worsened with the development of private 
security, where mercenaries can be imported. The new private security enterprise, 
28 
according to Sk6ns (2000: 14), "provide a variety of services, ranging from guarding 
installations, protecting convoys, supporting humanitarian assistance operations to 
performing reconnaissance and intelligence services, providing logistical and transport 
support, military training, strategic planning, and engaging in combat". They have 
become a buffer to less efficient and effective state armies for emergency actions to 
counteract rebels' incursion. Harris (2004: 34) argues that these new enterprises are 
operating without any legal limitation at the international and regional levels. Hellinger 
(2004: 213) argues that the UN has no plan to outlaw private securities but provide 
regulation of their activities, for example restricting their use of firearms. Their staff 
constitute ex-service men and new recruits who could be ex-combatants. Because they 
are a profit oriented business, they are prone to being contracted into participating in 
destabilizing activities. Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC and Angola have government, 
business interest groups, and regional organization such as ECOWAS engaging the 
services of such enterprises (Human Security Centre 2005: 37, 38). In 2005, a South 
African security company was implicated in providing fighters to participate in a coup 
in Equatorial Guinea. Some of the recruits involved having been arrested in Zimbabwe 
during a stopover (Hellinger 2004: 204). They have been released to be tried in South 
Africa as citizens by the anti-terrorist law (BBC News 13 January 2005). The dilemma of 
the new security enterprise will become a new challenge to rising milex unless an 
alternative non-violent approach to resisting rebellion or state pogrom is established. 
2.6. Alternatives to reliance on military defence 
Harris (2004b: 37ft) offers alternative suggestions for contemporary substitutes to military 
security in which the army is becoming less effective with the cost and nature of 
civilianized warfare. Currently, the key functions of the military are deterrence of external 
aggression against the sovereignty of the state and internal security in line with "territorial 
integrity" of the state. The challenges faced by post-modern states have compromised the 
army in non-traditional function as follows: internal security operations against opponents 
of the government; internal security operations, often together with the police services, 
against crime and as domestic peacekeepers; guarding land and sea borders against illegal 
immigrants and smuggling; protection of marine and other resources against poaching by 
locals and foreigners; civil defence during natural disasters and rescue work; international 
peacekeeping, and development tasks e.g. building infrastructure. 
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These added functions give credence to the essential service the army has been tasked to 
do. Harris (2004; 37 - 40) argues that these functions can be provided efficiently and 
effectively by civilians. Military peacekeeping has been found to prolong the duration of 
conflict the method results in its own conflicts (Luttwak 2001: 272). The arrogation of 
such tasks by the military makes it imperative for the defence sector to demand increased 
budget allocations. But such task would not necessarily inflate the budget. The problem of 
excessive expenditure goes with the confidential expenditure on arms in particular. In 
some countries the issue of increasing military personnel is a drain on the overall budget. 
South Africa, with high unemployment, is considering militarization as potential solution 
(Roux 2007). The creation of farming cadres and other income generative options would 
contribute effectively to the GDP growth of South Africa. The weakened states in Africa 
also find the military a costly burden. The idea of drastic cuts in military personnel has 
been argued by others as a poor solution with already high unemployment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Omitoogun 2001: 8). The post-war situation normally results in absolving ex-
combatants into the states regular army. There is the problem of "macro-insecurity" and 
"micro-security" where many of demobilized soldiers or ex-combatants link up with 
mercenary organizations, internal instability results, and local criminal activities increase. 
That makes demobilization and reintegration of state forces a difficult rational choice 
(Lewis, Harris and Santos 1999: 144). Already some post-war states face the challenges 
of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) with ex-combatants. Sierra 
Leone's planned reduction in the size of the army from 14,500 to 10,500 required funding 
to resettle volunteers (International Crisis Group 2003: 8). Kingma (2004: 158-159) view 
demobilisation as " ... central component[ s] of peace and development policy after violent 
conflict", it becomes a "security sector reform" policy to "downsizing" the government 
army and resettling ex-combatants for a productive post-war life. The expectation of 
demobilisation is to reduce military spending so it can be redirected to other 
developmental purposes after the war. This is followed by reintegration where ex-
combatants can rejoin the society without and be productive. 
The critical problem for the demobilisation and reintegration programme is funding. This 
has been experienced from Central America through to Africa and Asia where conflicts 
have occurred and ceased (Spencer 1997: 23, 42; Colletta, Korstner and Wielderhofer 
1996: 11-13; Rossi1 and Guistozzi 2006: 4-5). This is the dilemma faced with some 
demobilisation and reintegration activities so far in spite of its relevance in post-conflict 
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reconstruction and peace-building. But in the long run post-conflict peace, as Harris 
(1999: 42) puts it, is "incremental" requiring gradual adjustment as a programme. This 
depends on the perception and perspective of peace as either a state peace or human 
security or both. What then should be the best way to deal with rising defence costs 
caused by paying an unproductive army? 
Ibanez and Moya (2006) say, "[ u ]nderstanding the consequence of war is critical to craft 
policy programs aimed to mitigate the short and the long-term costs of conflict. In 
particular, the long term consequences of internal conflicts may hinder economic 
development on a significant basis by reducing human capital investments, destroying 
assets, and creating pockets of the population trapped in poverty vicious cycles". The 
solution to mitigate the burden imposed by the military through high milex can be argued 
from a policy perspective on three main factors (Harris 2004: 200,201). 
The first consideration is the preference for essential effectiveness of a military option 
that should justify the enormous input as optimal choice. Normally, it is not the case. For 
instance after months of convincing the world that a military option best suited deposing 
the Hussein regime in Iraq, the enormous cost in human life and trauma among other 
factors makes it ''unreasonably'' essential. The effectiveness is nullified by the increasing 
cost that will reach estimates of between $750 billion to $1.2 trillion by 2011 (Bilmes and 
Stiglitz 2006: 5). As Harris argued the new task of the defence sector can be better and 
more cheaply done by the civilian society. Agbese (1999: 233) claims the presence of 
technical incompetence of the soldiers relative to other segments of society. A mobilised 
civilian revolt, as argued by Sharp (2003) could have overthrown the Hussein autocratic 
regime. The Guei' military regime in Cote d'Ivoire was forced by civil disobedience to 
abandon the attempted continuation of a leader after a controversial electoral outcome 
(Human Rights Watch 2003: 8). 
The second consideration is the essential efficiency in application of military choice. 
Efficiency counts on the resource input and the time used to achieve objectives at a lesser 
cost by considering alternatives (Harris 2004: 190, 191). In West Africa, military reaction 
to rebel activities has been counterproductive and created unimaginable protracted 
conflicts that lasted almost decade. The decision to rely on military defence was 
miscalculated and bound to fail. A similar uprising in Cote d'Ivoire, with the rebel 
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occupation of the northern sector, drew almost half the country. Gbagbos' refusal to heed 
to ECOWAS counsel to refrain from a military solution has cost much than would have 
been by earlier peaceful negotiation (see page. 56f). A military solution does not offer 
efficient solution by considering the proportionate cost in human and material resources 
destroyed. There is a need for integrated-early-warning mechanisms to detect potential 
conflicts and the engagement of preventive diplomacy and peace-building (Lederach 
2002: 80, 81, 89). 
Scott and Wyeth (2006) distinguish peace-building as the gap between peace-keeping and 
development. Peace-building and development have a common focus on promoting well-
being but two separate conceptual origins. In a similar post-conflict circumstance, the 
reconstruction after the two World Wars focused on "creative peace". The Marshall Plan 
was based on European integration by "integrated economic and political order" under a 
supra-national institution as proposed by Paul Porter and colleagues (Hogan 1987: 36,37). 
Development does not necessarily originate from post-conflict reconciliation and 
reconstruction because development programmes, in many places, begin before any 
conflict. Peacebuilding bases its significance on dealing with the chaotic arena of conflict, 
where reconciliation and reconstruction are critical; it is an investment rather in 
development (General Assembly Security Council 2001: 2). It is displacing war as the 
only means of survival from the realist defence point of view (Francis 2004: 64). 
The third consideration is the essential consensuality over the military option to resolve 
intra-state conflicts or other conflicts. The legitimacy of the military option is still a 
problem because it is confined to the cabinet. The lopsided democracy that ends after 
electoral process limiting public choice in critical policy agenda such as decision to war is 
problem even with major democratic states in advanced countries, nevertheless 
developing countries. The political paradigm of realpoilitiks in African politics 
undermines democracy in defence and makes transparency in that sector impossible. The 
emerged new wars which are intra-state requires rational political choices as well as civil 
society inputs on defence security preference or to what extent should military decisions 
be subject to public participation? Generally the evidence of relative high milex and 
decision to war (as would be found in Chapter Three) indicates lack of consensuality and 
democratization of state security decisions in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The democratization of state security decisions in Sub-Saharan Africa will depend on 
influencing factors that shape the social construct of in society. In many countries the 
military symbolizes national pride and honour (Francis 2004: 64). The political realist 
school claims war is a natural human tendency which is strongly disputed by idealist and 
neo-liberalist schools as an erroneous tendency that can be corrected. Neoliberalists argue 
that ''violence and selfishness are not part of human condition but are the result of flawed 
institutions" (Holsti 1995: 2; Duncan 2002: 20, 21, 26, 27, 33). It will not be automatic 
that with certain distorted religious and political indoctrinations the majority of society 
will denounce war preparation and indeed the war option. For example, currently, Iran has 
the full support of its citizens to spend much money to develop nuclear bombs and the 
desire for war option is at its peak level (Lynch 28th August 2006, USATODAY). The 
increasing military spending in developed countries, the prevailing culture of violence 
that is characterized in media and entertainment, and the current Bush Europe Missile 
Shield Project which has angered Russia to consider withdrawing from the previous Cold 
War Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, entrenches militarism (Eshel - Accessed June 
2007). 
We see therefore the need for reorientation of the general societal idea of security which 
underlies militarization and armament as the popular paradigm for attaining peace. Dower 
(1995: 18 - 23) explicates security in relation to a ''value system" which is a "good" 
which is guarded by sustainable confidence and pride. Security therefore centres around 
three main concerns: a personal attitude to coping with confidence irrespective of relative 
issues; secondly is a form of uncertainty which perceive complete security as impossible 
therefore it becomes a goal to pursue; and thirdly, is protective focus and guard over what 
is valued and perceived to be vulnerable. The last two perceptions of security tend to 
shape the trend of international relations and local politics, especially with multiparty 
democracy. Security becomes the concern of opposition and those whose choice of voting 
did not materialize. The pursuit of security has become a burden in relation to what it cost 
to achieve it politically. The security takes the form of parties, identities, land and 
resources in particular area, as well as economic security, among others. The party in 
power and its supporters are those who feel secured by the occupation of state authority. 
Generally, in multiparty democracy, entrenchment of one party becomes a preoccupation 
and a value others die to sustain as it becomes one-sided nationalism (Pettman 1995: 24, 
25). Security has its moral implication as a good. Dower says that the pursuit of a person 
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(or a state's) security should not undennine another person's or a state's security in terms 
of value. Harris (2004: 6) supports this saying that security is no longer ''territorial'' 
protection which gives much significance to the military. Dower then argues that the 
pursuit of security using conventional systems and institutions like the military cannot 
conform to that moral principle with regard to upholding the security of others. The 
reason is that "peace" is the object of "security interest" and by undermining others 
security impinges on their peace. Therefore "whatever leads to peace provides security". 
Thus homes, community, and nation with peace signify the freedom and security that 
abound. 
Peace is not guaranteed by the wish for it. Individuals and society work and ensures 
peace through the manner and approach conflict issues and difference and wrongs are 
handled and resolved. Conflict resolution concisely is "to tum opposed positions - the 
claim and its rejection - into a single outcome" (Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1988: 4). This 
can be done by reconciling the basic concerns among parties, identifying the party that 
is right by legitimate standards, and/or identifying the most powerful which has much 
influence upon the outcome. In this case power should give way to rights and interest as 
prior areas in reconciliation (Ury et al 1988: 5, 7, 8, 19). Total security therefore should 
be equivalent to the wellbeing of a state and its citizens, and even its ecology. 
2.7. Summary 
This chapter began with review of the trend of wars since 1990. The last quarter of the 
1990s could be described as the epitome of intra-state conflict in Africa since the period 
of liberation struggles in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the period into the twenty-
first century has seen some level of reduction in intra-state or new wars in Africa. The 
decline however still placed Africa on top as a conflict prone area which requires much 
study to identify the key factors causing new wars or intra-state wars. This led to a review 
of the trends of milex and found that African states with conflict history or on-going 
conflict and those in a security dilemma generally resort to high milex as state security or 
conflict deterrence. This has been observed to affect human security or development 
spending where milex per GDP exceeds the five percent range. The recourse to high 
milex by Sub-Saharan African countries is also attributed to influential factors from the 
international system, based on Western foreign policy, and market for arms manufacturing 
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companies. Therefore effect has three main impacts: firstly, non-transparency on new 
arms procurement causes regional insecurity and proliferation of small-light weapons. 
Secondly, internal security dilemma relate to state failure and insoluble debt due to non-
budgeted arms procurement than budgeted approach, maintenance of large number of 
non-productive military personnel. Thirdly, at the individual leadership level, the 
international influence which combines with the personal perception and the ideology of a 
leader, determines the type of security choice either state or human security. The issue of 
privatization of military functions raised the concern for demilitarization, peaceful 
alternative to non-military conflict resolution, and early warning mechanisms. The 
essence of this has been supported by the new perception and meaning given to security 
which centres not on state territorial protection per se but on general human welfare, 
wellbeing, as human security. 
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Chapter Three 
Grievance or greed as main underlying causes of wars in Africa 
Many factors have been cited as cause of civil wars. However scholars and conflict 
analysts remain divided on specific root problems that trigger armed conflicts. The 
prominent post-1990s civil war or new wars discourse has focused on grievance issues 
as the underlying reason for armed conflicts. These include: ethnicity, religious 
intolerance, state failure to secure emerging democracy, fragmentation of state, amongst 
others. As scholars grapple with the reasons these factors incite devastation beyond 
reasonable levels, another school of thought championed by Collier and Hoeffler posit 
the greed hypothesis. The greed and grievance discourse implies the need of "motive" 
and "opportunity" to incite armed rebellion in a state (Collier 2006: 7). The motive is 
linked to the non-measurable but observable behaviour as greed which is identified as 
looting or plundering of illegal resources of state through rebel activity. Opportunity is 
also linked to the prevailing political and socio-economic conditions that offer room to 
raise issues of injustice that warrant violent change as the only avenue. Whilst the two 
schools of thought have similar basis, the premise of interpretation and analysis has 
created rivalry between them rather than causing them to be complimentary. Grievance 
takes a positivist perspective on critical empirical evidence. The neo-liberal economist 
perspective of greed is post-positivist and therefore espouses its argument on non-
empirical behavioural tendency of rebels alone. The new wars debate is another arena of 
Peace Studies and International Relations discourse seeking reasonable explanations for 
the emerging new civil wars and their nature. This section will review both the 
grievance and greed debates with the aim of highlighting merits and demerits in their 
discourse for military policy implications. 
3.1.The grievance discourse 
The grievance proponents from a social and political perspective do not specifically 
focus on one reason as the cause of war but have broad range of factors as possible 
causes and contributors, as acknowledged by Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 9). Some of 
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the causes of civil war by the grievance school of thought are empirical in nature, and 
lend themselves to easier scientific measurement and observation. For example political 
and non-state actors' mismanagement of civil positions and commitment, and human 
rights violations can be composed into data from economic growth impact, social 
service structure and delivery assessment, and social relations between ethnic groups. 
As a structural mechanism, grievance implies direct and indirect use of systems and 
institutional arrangements to violate the basic rights of those who deserve to be 
protected by the state. The violation of human rights is a critical issue that can polarize 
society into antagonism and eventually violence. In Lukes (1974: 24) grievance has 
political implications and is defined as, " ... an articulated demand, based on political 
knowledge, an undirected complaint arising out of everyday experience, a vague feeling 
of unease or sense of deprivation" As a political issue, political systems and issues and 
actors' behaviour have been cited as avenues through which root causes of civil wars are 
located when basic life issues are infringed upon. Three main political processes and 
practices that can be used to violate human rights, the basis of grievance theory, are 
presented below. 
3.1.1. Immature democratic process 
Immature democratic process is the condition of democratization where the learning 
process of political actors and other stakeholders can be fragile to the point of inciting 
conflict. Mansfield and Snyder (2001: 120-124) argue that immature democratization 
crisis causes war. Competition for popular support by certain elites in the 
democratization process can result a power struggle to secure their mass support 
(Brown 2001: 221). In Africa, such instances have prevailed in the way individuals have 
chosen to use violence if they cannot, by the ballot box, secure the power to rule. 
Ayoob (2001: 127-129) has indicated that formation of states in Europe followed a 
pattern of internal political struggle towards achieving nationhood. Such 
characterization is described as "primitive central state power accumulation" which has 
three distinctive aspects: (i) territorial expansion and consolidation under political 
authority, (ii) policing of the state to keep order, and (iii) the use of taxation and 
resource extraction to generate income to honour regime's national political agenda. 
Scholars have observed that the power accumulation, which resulted in the taxation and 
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resource extraction processes, is reversed when states decide to become democratic. So 
when sharing political power becomes inevitable this can lead to possible frustration for 
the state authority. The problem is connected to what Kaldor (2004: 168-169) describes 
as "patrimonial leaders [using] tribal networks as a way of rationing out scarce 
governmental resources" which is prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Sometimes the state, according to Mansfield et al (2001), shows its prowess by utilizing 
diversionary tactics into external aggression, a way to calm internal discontent. Sudan's 
quasi-democratization with its prevailing internal racial and religious problems was 
bordering fragmentation due to oppression of southern Sudan black citizens with 
politics of exclusion. Sudan's export of its internal problems through aiding insurgents' 
activities crosses territorial frontiers into Uganda, Eritrea-Ethiopia war and recently 
Chad incurs similar reprisal (International Crisis Group 2005 and 2006). The breakdown 
of non-interference with regard to sovereignty in Africa is also attributed to legacies 
from modernity imposed through European colonization created nation-state system 
which constructs state around militarism (Melander et al 2006: 7). The enormous cost 
involved has varying consequence for poor economies if the state fails to deliver on its 
commitment to citizens. The resulting regional-wise conflict becomes inevitable. 
3.1.2. Fragmentation of nation-state in globalisation 
The fragmentation of the nation-state has become a factor that can frustrate early 
democratization processes. The nation-state is the galvanisation of the prior organised 
state and nationalism into composite units under a single authority. Biswas (2001: 182) 
has described the capacity and success of the nation-state as its ability to protect 
national identity and aspirations. This manifests both in economic prosperity and 
cultural unity. For example, Sudan, at the edge of fragmentation, was attributed the lack 
of "core identity" of the state (Sisk 2001: 794). The advent of globalisation, economic 
and cultural hegemony induces destabilization in, especially, third world nation-states 
currently adopting democracy (Melander et al 2006: 8). Kaldor (2004: 169) supports the 
fact that "globalisation breaks down the homogeneity of the nation-state. Globalisation 
involves diversity as well as uniformity, the local as well as the global". But the reality 
of social and national identity is superimposed by the activities of supranational ideals 
through Western cultural hegemony. The imbalance in the global economic system 
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which comes with Western values has contributed to emerging African democratic states 
trapped in debt. The heavily indebted condition rumes the internal stability of 
economically and politically weak African countries with rippling effects occurring 
within the sub-regional enclave (Uzodike 1996, 1999; Economic Commission for Africa 
2005: 141). In the instance of a failing economy, patriarchal leadership tend to look to 
the survival of their stronghold of supporters. The excessive manner Zaire under 
Mobuto conducted his patronage politics plunged the state into political turmoil 
(Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 95). 
Democracy according the literature is capable of ensuring peace (Bloomfield et al 1998: 
16 - 20). But formal democracy (legislature, political parties, elections, etc) without 
some contextualisation can be counterproductive and disintegrate the state (Busumtwi-
Sam 2002: 107). The imposition of mere majoritarian democracy in post-war can 
undermine peace-making efforts or conflict management as evidences show across 
Africa with ethnic based conflicts (Sisk 2001: 793). The majority choices are imposed 
on the minority when it may not be just. As Gwartney, Lawson and Gartzke (2005: 29) 
note: 
Democracy is desirable for many reasons but policies that encourage, or 
even seek to impose, representative government are unlikely to 
contribute directly to international peace. 
Gwartney et aI, defend democracy as not the cause of violence, but the economic model 
of a free-market which generates economic problems and creates the propensity for 
intra-state violence. In this case, a good democratic structure that guarantees power 
sharing and participation of the minority who may never become the majority, can also 
be involved in critical decision-making is essential (Abdallah 2001: 162; Mbaku 1999: 
300 - 301). A good power sharing democracy will expose policies to policy-dialogue 
where both the winners and losers can reach consensus and ineffectiveness due to 
incompetence can be minimized (Uzodike 2001: 299, 303, 310). This is a key factor for 
sustaining a stable political system and enhanced decision-making for effective impact. 
It means divergent parties in the state can have their wishes carried out, and this is the 
basis for a good approach to development. Development fails when the needs of some 
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national sub-cultural or minority group(s) are trivialized. The Ogoni Niger Delta area in 
Nigeria has been marginalised in terms of development despite the region being the 
primary source of Nigeria's wealth (Mazumdar and Daniel 2005). The resultant 
grievance can degenerate into large scale destruction if politicians continue to take the 
local people for granted. In addition Kaldor (2004: 176) says, "[v]iolence unfortunately 
squeezes the space for reason and deliberation". These issues confirm conflict theory 
that social differences can be politicized into ethnicity and nationalism (Avruch 2003). 
Mismanaged democracy ends up in economic marginalization and ethno-religious 
discriminations as structural violence (Kent 1995: 382-383; Bloomfield et. al. 1998: 35-
36). Many SSA states evince democracy that politicise ethnicity, economic opportunity, 
and religious differences. 
3.1.3. Constitution tampering 
Compulsive constitution amendment by the majority without proper consideration of 
minority interest can engender internal destabilization which also can extend beyond the 
territorial boundaries (Uzodike 2004: 300, 306). Some serious changes that seek to 
extend a particular occupation of power by one party and group can spell fatal 
consequences. The Ugandan constitution was amended to extend the expiring two-term 
presidential mandate of Musevini (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). 
This made it impossible for the opposition side to have any hope of acceding to political 
authority too. The Chadian constitution was amended to extend the reign of Idriss Derby 
whose mandate of two terms was about to expire (BBC News 2006). Guet made 
constitutional changes that triggered the Cote d'Ivoire conflict later. According to 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2001) "Guel made several substantiv 
e changes to the text, including inserting controversial language regarding the eligibility 
requirements of a president, before submitting the draft constitution to a referendum" in 
Cote d'Ivoire. Clearly, constitutional changes are good when they seek genuinely to 
improve the workings of a document created by citizens. However, when those changes 
are used by some segments of the population to extend their stay in office, it points to an 
internal struggle for power. Necessarily, such manoeuvres serve to trigger counter-
manoeuvres and resistance from segments that may stand to lose with the changes or 
who otherwise foresee bigger problems with the proposed changes. This can be a 
highly charged and dangerous political environment unless the tensions are managed 
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very carefully. 
The grievance theory provides broad-spectrum of causal factors when analysis civil war. 
It is potentially an appropriate model that captures varying political and socio-economic 
variables and other qualitative issues such as the greed which was supposed to have 
triggered civil wars in Africa since 1990. 
3.2. The greed discourse 
The contention of greed theory is that rebellion is large-scale predation of productive 
economic activities. Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 2) argue that, 
[g]rievances are often interpreted as one of the main causes of conflict. However, 
there are very few measures of objective grievances available. In our work ... we 
found no evidence that neither income nor land inequality have an effect on the 
risk of conflict. 
Collier and Hoeffler, and others contend that the motive for civil wars cannot be 
attributed to altruistic grievance but opportunistic greed which preys on available 
incentives. They insist that greed is more important to predict rebellion than grievance 
(Collier 2000: 339-340). The greed proponents believe strongly that no amount of 
grievance can lead people to armed conflicts that normally continue over years. The 
only plausible factor is opportunistic rational aggression to pillage a weak state of 
resources such as diamonds and crude oil. Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 3) argue that, 
. . . interpretation of conflict is obviously not shared by rebel organizations or by 
the people who honestly support them: the justice of the struggle seems central 
to success. By contrast, the economic theory of conflict argues that the 
motivation of conflict is unimportant; what matters is whether the organization 
can sustain itself financially. It is this, rather than any objective grounds for 
grievance which determine whether a country will experience civil war. 
Therefore, based on econOInlC rationality, armed "rebellions" are nothing less than 
individuals desire to ransack the state for private material gains. Typical examples of such 
ulterior motives in greed assumption cite armed rebellion in mineral resourced countries 
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such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Chad, Uganda, the Niger Delta basin 
conflict in Nigeria and other places in the African region. The Sierra-Leone war enabled 
Sankoh and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to pillage the country's diamond 
mines. That became the life-line for the survival and operation of the RUF, self-created 
"personal army", according to Collier (2006). The eventual aftermath of peace agreement 
for cessation of conflicts saw rebel leaders demanding ministerial positions over mineral 
resources. Can greed alone be the single reason for mineral resource plundering of 
significant scale and brutal devastation of a whole country? Will such desire lead to years 
of protracted war? The assertion depends on the type of mineral wealth being plundered. 
Indeed since diamonds are not a "lootable" resource, they could potentially prolong a war 
but appear not to be the cause (Ross 2004: 340) 
In the DRC, external interest in the massive mineral rich country contributes to the 
difficulty of achieving lasting peace agreement. The reason is also attributed to the rebel 
factions as instruments promoting violence under which mineral resources are exploited 
cheaply or stolen. The issue of external "conflict entrepreneurs" is raised, in this 
instance, where they collaborate with the rebel groups who cause extensive chaos as a 
result of the resources they have looked. Collier (2006: 1) then asserts that, 
Economic analysis sees rebellion as more like a fonn of organized crime, or 
more radically, as something that is better understood from the distinctive 
circumstances in which it is feasible, rather than worrying about what might 
motivate its participants. Either economists are being excessively cynical, or 
popular perceptions are badly misled. 
By equating rebellion to "criminal" activity, it has been suggested that all rebel leaders 
are criminals. In reality, genuine rebellion due to genuine grievance and causes does 
exist. Conflicts over ideology which are normally personality and individual centred 
cannot be categorised as an ulterior criminal act. Such conflicts begin as contestation for 
political authority but eventually result in armed confrontation due to intolerant 
government and the uncompromising nature of non-state actors involved. How then do 
we distinguish genuine rebellion from criminal one within greed theory? This is difficult 
to answer using by the greed hypothesis which alludes to observable behaviour alone. 
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The greed position is simplistic and makes it difficult to determine if there is any 
conflict that is not greed oriented because civil wars are economized in commodity 
terms and not in moral or political ways (Mack 2002). Wars, which ever way societies 
wage it, cannot be said to be sane with its destructive impact that embarrasses the sanity 
of rational humans. In most wars, pillaging, extortion and the use of torture, force and 
destructive ways to amass plundering resources has always existed. The false perception 
of violence as the natural tendency of humans is itself problematic. Human 
destructiveness, such as war, is learnt and such tendency can be transformed, "people 
can learn to think and act brutally, so they can learn to think and act with care and 
respect" (Francis 2004: 67). 
According to Hinde and Rotblat (2003: 108), some terrible wars have been waged under 
a religious guise, justifying the butchery of other people for either religious or ethnic 
differences (sometimes both) across the globe. The Kashmir conflict between India and 
Pakistan, and the Jewish and Palestinian conflicts, e.g., have become excessively 
prolonged in modem times due to religious and ethnic colouration of the two conflicts 
(Habibullah 2004: 5, 14; ). Brown (2001: 210-211) notes that "language and religion are 
especially powerful ethnic makers" and ethnic conflict surrounds varied issues such as 
political, economic, social, cultural or territorial matters. This why Melander et al 
(2006; also Duncan 2002: 26), argue that the motive of new wars cannot be dissociated 
from historical and ancient origins of what causes humans to take up arms and wage war. 
Therefore, Melander et al affirm, in quoting Clausewitz's On War, that " ... modern 
warfare is a conflict between organized armies on the battlefield and is a continuation of 
politics by other means, the logic of which tends toward extremes in warfare". This tells 
us that the mode of old and new wars might be different, but the motive remains a 
puzzle and the reason for ongoing debate and research. The point is if scholars in 
framing models try to dissociate "structures" and "actors and behaviour" they eliminate 
account of strategies, motives and behaviour of local stakeholders in conflict (Mehler 
2005: 31; Ross 2003: 21, 22). In benign manner greed proponents postulate that, the 
theory may have a symbiotic relationship in rebellion: to get started, rebellion needs 
grievance, whereas to be sustained, it needs greed (Collier 2000: 852). Again there is the 
'chicken and the egg' (which came first) debate by arguing that greed takes advantage 
of "conflict traps" (Collier et al 2003: 79). It is then difficult to explain which actually 
causes the other. 
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Recent articles have raised doubt over the greed theory claiming that new wars 
especially from the 1990s are based mostly on greed and therefore all warlords are 
categorised criminals. Collier (2000: 851) tries to persist in his position by saying " .. .it 
is hard to see the crime-to-rebellion story as a general phenomenon" by other school of 
thought in the debate. Collier noted that if his rationality card be implausible, empirical 
data can vindicate greed as a valid motive for a rebel leader. But for instance, 
International Alert and Powell and Yahya (2006) Report on diamond mining in Mano 
River Basin in West Africa does not indicate resources as basic causal factor of conflicts 
in West Africa. The evidences in the document indicate that they are contributing factors 
and serve to fuel conflict rather than starting them: 
Diamonds helped fuel the civil wars of Sierra Leone and Liberia during the 
1990s, prompting the UN Security Council to ban diamond exports by Sierra 
Leone between 2000 and 2003 and impose a diamond embargo on Liberia that 
is still in place (Powell and Yahya 2006:5). 
There is a distinction between fuelling elements and causal or provocative factors. In the 
case of the Cote d'Ivoire separatist conflict, the document disproved that diamonds for 
instance are a major source of income for the rebels. Other exportable commodities such 
as cocoa, coffee, timber and cotton revenue are also used by the rebels. The evidence 
available shows that the rebels actually use the revenues for their survival and 
replenishing the weaponry. The motive then for their rebellion is not a question of 
resource plunder alone but perspective. What has been rebels' perception of state 
resource? In the words of New Forces leader Guillaume Soro, "how can we tell these 
people to stop mining for diamonds? It would be like ordering a peasant to stop 
cultivating his land" (Powell and Yahya 2006: 5). This does not rule out the evidence of 
some war crimes committed by fighting forces and some level of exploitation. The 
Powell and Yahya report noted that, 
The New Forces military commanders responsible for security in Seguela and 
Tortiya, appeared to be enriching themselves personally themselves from 
diamond mining. They noted that some of these men had recently acquired 
brand new four-wheel drive vehicles and had begun to show other signs of new-
found wealth (Powell and Yahya 2006: 22). 
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Despite the case of some level of plunder by certain individuals, such particular 
behaviour cannot constitute the very root factor for the cause of the Cote d'Ivoire 
conflict. They exemplify normal warring men's behaviour with booty, as is evident in 
history. Non-state warriors do not have access to state military resources but in a sense 
have an obligation to acquire resources for defence and to achieve their objectives. Ross 
(2004: 349) argues Angola rebels resorted to looting after the end of Cold War due to 
the diminishment of their external funding. 
Rebels will not resort to full-scale war in order to plunder natural resources knowing 
that they shall be controlled by government forces. This may sound plausible if there is 
a systemic level of aid and motivation. The engagement in plundering has been argued 
as not the motive but means to survive and continue their war efforts (Ross 2004: 342). 
The greed model which only provided a reductionist framework to predict the 
occurrence of war due to the measure of natural resources therefore deliberately ignored 
the critical role of state actors and structural issues involved in the conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffier 2004; Mehler 2005: 13,31; Fjede 2006; Waltz 1974: 18, 19,36). The armed 
insurrection against certain military juntas' persistent human right violations cannot be 
equated to greed. The rebellion against the Menghisto regime in Ethiopia, where the 
country is not rich in natural resources is an example. The model is structurally sensible 
with qualitative based assumptions, but may fail to determine how the actual motive 
behind warring parties' key actors began. There is also a limitation to model variables 
as greed did not test non-fuel minerals, as argued by Ross (2004: 349), and it is 
systemically limited in its analysis. 
There is also the contention of greed that "surprising empirical regularities is that 
societies which are diverse in terms of both ethnicity and religion seem to be 
significantly safer than societies which are homogenous" (Collier and Hoeffier 2006: 
11). This evidence does not support the critical religious tension in northern Nigeria 
with recurrent violence between Muslims and Christians. The conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, 
Sudan, Somalia and Chad cannot be isolated from the context of plurality of religions, 
ethnicity and race. Recent research finds that Somalia cannot be a homogenous society 
thirteen living languages and six clans (Human Sciences Research Council, 2006: 6). 
The research indicates that, 
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· .. . contributing factors for the Somali conflict are; competition for power 
among the clans, especially between the Daroud and Bawiye clans, the 
destruction of the Beer, Somalia's traditional conflict resolution mechanism by 
colonialism, especially in the south, economic decline, rising inequality, and 
availability of large quantities of weapons in the country. 
Therefore attributing Somali conflict to Ayeed is contrary to proper consideration of the 
context of political history even from the time of Italian occupation (Collier and 
Hoeffier 2006: 13). The legacy of non-contextualised democracy made it easy for 
entrenching military rule which perpetuated the colonial use of force and "divide and 
rule" (Uzodike 2004: 299 - 300). In trying to validate the theory, Collier and Hoeffier 
(2006: 13) argue further that, 
[w]hen such conflicts [civil wars] are viewed during or after the event, the 
observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict have used the discourse 
of group hatred in order to build fighting organizations. It is natural for 
observers to interpret such conflicts as being caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, 
the conflicts have caused the inter-group hatred .. .. 
Several writers have alluded pre-independent method of 'divide-and-rule' as a nascent 
factor in recent intractable conflicts. The divisions in Rwanda and Burundi, and Sudan 
(where even the southern citizens were excluded from writing the constitution), and in 
Cote d'Ivoire where the French policy of elite education discriminated against the 
northern citizens are good examples. The French supported a government who had 
planned serious pogrom and refrained from protecting the Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
(Peterson 2000: 280-284). The continuous method of 'divided-and-rule' by post-
colonial independent governments with patronage politics that favours party supporters 
and particular identity groups need not be overemphasized in Africa. Such practices 
have wedged a rift in African societies, both in economy and resource distribution 
before 1990. Such example of Africa's post-colonial leadership has left a reality of 
instability through greediness manifested in the misappropriation of state resources. In 
the Sierra Leone case, the evidence by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) 
did not exonerate other non-state parties and the successive governments from looting 
and human rights violations. According to the TRC Report (Vol I: 5), 
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Sierra Leone was systematically plundered and looted by all factions in the 
conflict. The Commission found the RUF to have been responsible for the 
largest number of human rights violations in the conflict. 
Further arguments show that patronage-politics, as practiced in Sierra Leone, with 
license from external governmental actors, led to misappropriation of state funds than 
for citizens' wellbeing (Reno 2003: 45 - 47). 
The data basis of the greed and grievance discourse as single dominant causal variable 
has been problematic in spite of the level at which the theory originates. The Collier and 
Hoeffier model ignores the systemic predatory economic impact on the African 
economy and the weaknesses caused by exploitation (Uvin 2001: 19). Challenged by 
the empirical research of Ross (2004: 337) which indicates that fourteen field research 
evidence least prove that greed is the viable basis for civil war. However, Ross 
considers greed as one of the various factors that need to be considered depending on 
the analysis of the conflict cause but not the single causal variable as espoused by 
Collier and Hoeffier. Humphreys (2005: 533-534) says the theory "suffers from severe 
problem of data, model specification, and in particular a sensitivity of coefficient 
estimates to variations in model specification. This weakness is confirmed in Rosser 
(2006: 18, 19) is that "[t]he problem with this approach is that it tells us nothing about 
the structural characteristics of societies - that is whether, groups are defined primarily 
in class, ethnic or religious terms and what the relationship between different social 
elements is". 
Moreover, the greed hypothesis posits that intra-state conflicts are excessively 
prolonged due to their origin with resources. Humphreys (2005: 514) disagrees on the g 
round that "natural resource conflicts are more likely to end quickly and are more likely 
to end with military victory for one side rather than with a negotiated settlement". What . 
Humphreys draws attention to is that greed alone does not guarantee total loyalty. His 
conclusion further indicates his affirmation of grievance as a viable model to help 
explain the pattern of civil wars in Africa than ''booty futures and state capture 
hypotheses" (Humphreys 2005: 534). This is supported by Ross (2004) and Rosser 
(2006) alike in that the looting (plundering) hypothesis is not tenable though greed plays 
a substantial role in some case such as DRC. The case of Zimbabwe lends some tenable 
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evidence to greed as lack of lootable primary commodities might have stalled civil war 
with African regional political actors' interest as happened in DRC in 1998. Arms to 
rebel groups or opposition militia will have to be supplied through a neighbouring state 
if the external interest at stake is worth the risk. The greed hypothesis therefore 
undergirds intensive militarization as the state's safeguard to resist and prevent rebellion 
(Mack 2001: 521). Indeed Busumtwi-Sam (2002: 94) says that " ... the main issue is not 
the ability to predict a crisis but to learn as much as possible about the underlying 
pattern of such crises . . . " . The frowning over the undercurrent in intra-state conflicts by 
greed hypothesis is the missing link and point of departure between greed and grievance. 
3.3. Summary 
In reviewing the debates, the research found grievance linking new civil wars in Sub-
Saharan Africa to political, socio-cultural and economic issues that violate human rights 
in particular. They are mainly political and social issues such as immature democracy, 
fragmentation of the nation state in globalisation in Africa, and constitutional tampering. 
The hypothesis, without limiting itself to particular variable, provides a model 
conducive for intra-state conflict causes analysis. On the side of greed hypothesis, the 
motive is not the issue but economic opportunity. Motive is just a means to initiate 
violence for state capture and plundering of mineral resources. Though it has some 
validity, it's claim appears to be one-sided with elements of biasness. It also lacks in-
depth substantive form from assumptions based on inadequate variables such as 
distinctions of resources and ethnicity categories. Both theories present valid viewpoints 
but speak from divergent paradigms and perspectives. This position tallies with Ross' 
(2004) view that, 
The major quantitative studies of civil war have produced different findings 
about the role of natural resources; these differences were presumably caused 
by differences in the underlying data bases, models of civil war, estimation 
procedures, and techniques for handling missing data. Reconciling these 
findings - and identifying the factors that have produced the differences in the 
findings - would help us identify which of the resource conflict relationships 
are truly robust. 
The absence of complimenting the various models creates policy discrepancies which 
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nonnally affect government budget priorities. In the absence of complimenting the 
various discourses, resolution to conflicts may be difficult and therefore the tendency 
for political actors to depend excessively on the military to provide security. The 
Chapter Two showed that such state security based on the military is illusive and a lack 
of human security results in disloyalty of both military and society which can trigger 
conflict and violent consequences with human rights violations. The next chapter will 
review some cases of major new wars or civil wars since 1990 in SSA and examine the 
key triggering issues. 
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Chapter Four 
Intra-state wars in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 
This chapter, review the incidence of major civil wars in the regions of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The previous discourses in Chapter Two and Three have provided perspective 
for profiling conflicts and key actors across Africa. These perceptions will be linked to 
the integrative framework that assesses issues from systemic, regional, national, and 
individual structures that make civil wars likely. This will help to identify factors in the 
structures that work together to trigger conflict. The profiling will adopt aspects of 
Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) argument in identifying the actor, the issues, and the 
underlying factors. The notion is to justify whether actors' initial motive are directly 
linked with greed. The key patterns of mimetic greediness in rebel leaders need to be 
identified by correlating the manner and timing of looting; also identify whether there 
are circumstantial issues that are critical and highly provocative to incite armed violence. 
How does the pre-colonial historical warfare context inform current intra-state 
conflicts? Africa had its major wars (mostly intra-state which involved government and 
rebel militia forces) between 1990 and 2006. The subsequent years have registered 
decline (see table 1). Which of the identified factors can be attributed to the upsurge in 
the 1990s and the decline beyond 2000? Is greed an adequate answer? Do other reasons, 
as root factors in African new wars exist? 
4.1. Pre-colonial society and militarism in Africa 
Before reviewing new wars it is necessary to review the pre-colonization scenario of 
militarism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Generally, pre-colonial African wars took place with 
divergent motives and patterns. Those that took place in kingdoms were secessionist 
motivated by "desire for power and prestige" and often left a bloody trail. Expansion by 
annexation to ensure security and avenues for survival by taxation and tribute payment 
were major motivational factors (Uzoigwe 1975: 480; Becker 1966: 23f). There were 
others of religious nature, aimed at purification, as occurred with the Sokoto Caliphate 
expansionism in Nigeria; and also territorial establishment and revenge among others 
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(Roberts 1980: 391). The formation of the Zulu kingdom by King Shaka happened after 
the defeat of the Dingiswayo of Mthethwa Empire, also occured through various 
campaigns. The escape of Shaka's key adversary, Zwide of Ndwandane resulted in his 
conquest of tribes of Nyasaland and the formation of the Shangana Empire (Becker 
1966: 32). Yoruba Alafin of Oyo engaged in annual wars as "deliberate" exercises of 
manhood (Smith 1988: 104). The Massais of East Africa were known as "warriors" 
whose passion was "cattle and warfare" (Muriuki 1974: 83, 84). Cattle raiding, slave 
capturing, and attainment of manhood are common rationales for the inter-ethnic and 
intra-tribal conflicts. 
Becker (1966: 23) describes most of the wars as lacking "organized warfare" and 
"disorderly assemblage of cattle raiders". He ascribed the victories of Dingiswayo to his 
ability in transforming traditional males' initiation guild into military barracks, though 
that did not constitute a standing army. He also conscripted males of defeated clans into 
military units. Similarly the Sokoto Caliphate and Oyo chief had limited armies made of 
mostly from captured slaves (Roberts 1980: 397; Smith 1988: 99). Normally, trained 
slaves retained their routine role as limited militia for rapid action in most dominant 
groups. But many ethnic groups did not have such luxury. Generally, male citizens in 
the kingdom or the clans offered compulsory warfare service. The social structures 
provided military training through adulthood male initiation rites. After the requisite 
puberty rite which took place when a teenager, the initiate qualifies to contribute to 
defence or the raiding service. Because militarism was an aspect of the integrated social 
system, it took its ethics from traditional religious values (Muriuki 1974: 124). That 
obliged the warrior to conform to a level of respect for innocent lives. Sotho warriors, 
for instance, took women and children captives as they frighten men away or in the 
course of resistance (Lye 1969: 47). Kikuyus forbid wanton killing of women and 
children, and it was "taboo" for a warrior to rape or seduce females during war (Muriuki 
1974: 125). Yorubas and Zulus generally refrained from sheer massacre unless they 
experienced resistance. Nevertheless, the records of most historical conquests contained 
significant bloodshed. 
The encounters with guns by the arrival of European traders changed the pattern of one-
sided internecine conquest in most places in Africa. Benin or Dahomeans in 1840 were 
able to repel their perennial Yorubas subduers by being the first to use firearms. 
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According to Uzoigwe (1975: 474) the massive supply of guns and powder to coastal 
kings by European traders began another larger predation to capture more slaves from 
the Savannah hinterland groups. It resulted in the commercialization of wars for its 
lucrative benefit in human trade. Therefore the importance of African traditional warfare 
has been its capability of annexation, cheap slave labour and slave exchange for 
economic (material) gains. Jihad kingdoms turned captured slaves into a buffer for 
defence, and excess slaves constituted purchasing power in terms of accessing European 
goods and firearms. The commodification of people for both local and export purposes 
warranted the proliferation of firearms along the coastal belts of Africa and into the 
interior (Roberts 1980: 400). Smith (1988: 105) says, "Warriors were coming 
increasingly to prefer taking captives in battle, as slaves material, rather than to kill or 
maim their enemies". Therefore, trade in slaves and its material and economic benefits 
determined the pace and occurrence of wars before formal colonization. It was therefore 
a period during which neighbours got enriched by enslaving their neighbours for labour 
or exchanged them for some other value. 
4.2. Economic community of West Africa (ECOWAS) conflicts 
West Africa is one of the Africa sub-regions with prolonged major and minor conflicts. 
This occurred mainly in five countries Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote 
d'Ivoire and Nigeria where sporadic religious conflict between Muslims and Christians 
caused destruction of property and death. 
With exception of Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone are endowed with natural and 
mineral resources that, if well administered, are capable of alleviating acute endemic 
poverty in these countries. Cote d'Ivoire has its northern sector seriously 
underdeveloped due to lack of government concern for that area because most of the 
inhabitants are claimed by government as not being full citizens of Cote d'Ivoire 
(Human Rights Watch 2003: 6 - 8). Liberia consists of indigenes and non-indigenous 
group of former freed salves from America. Liberia became independent in 1847 and 
had been one party state ruled by the True Whig Party (TWP) dominated by Americo-
Liberian blacks. Tolbert, the last leader of TWP, was overthrown in a bloody coup and 
murdered by Samuel Doe in October 1980 (Ellis 1995: 175). Doe comes from the 
Krahns (indigenous) group who are less educated, and mostly illiterate, without interest 
52 
in political involvement. Stephen Ellis (1995: 116) has noted that, "[t]here was already a 
history of enmity between Doe's own Krahn, on the one hand, and the Gio and Mano on 
the other, resulting from the politics of the military after the 1980 coup, which had 
already led to bloodshed in 1985". That event's human rights violations was enough of a 
sign of eminent bloodshed should the Gio and Manos get the opportunity for power 
again, according to a US Human Rights group report in 1986. However, prior to Doe's 
coup there was coexistence between various ethnic and religious groups. 
Doe political incompetence, desire to entrench his rule, and atrocities in killing former 
head of state Tolbert had attracted displeasure by neighbouring states' leaders such as 
Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, and Compaore of Burkina Faso (Ellis 1995: 174; 
Sierra Leone TRC Report 2002 - 2007 Volume 3, item 35, 39). Charles Taylor, an ex-
convict and prison escapee from an American jail, is American-Liberian descent 
organized rebellion with support from Cote d"Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya in 
particular. Libya had trained young militia men and ex-soldiers from that part of West 
Africa for revolutionary purpose. Libya had become another post-modem major 
destabilizing, and minor hegemon in Africa due to her anti-American sentiment. In 1990 
Taylor and his recruited forces began horrible carnage after government forces launched 
an offensive attack. The ensuing war lasted a decade with human cost around two-
hundred thousand. The clear intension of Taylor was shown to be his aspiration to Head of 
State by removing Doe. There was also the ultimate desire to avenge the Krahn people by 
Taylor. This required massive resources which had underscored his involvement in 
procurement scandal as head of government procurement. According to Ellis (1995: 169, 
180) America could have prevented the ten year blood bath, but President Bush was more 
interested in salvaging Kuwait from Hussein. Those who supported Taylor expected a 
simple coup. The poorly resourced ECOMOG intervention force, mostly from Nigeria 
and Ghana could not prevent the arrest and assassination of Doe. 
Taylor's militia later split into two opposing factions with the other controlled by Prince 
Yomi Johnson also trained in Libya. The two groups fought each other concurrently 
whilst maintaining their advances against the Krahn dominated people. The heavy 
armament of the rebel forces made it difficult for the ECOMOG intervention forces. 
Taylor took over the diamond areas and lumbered timber for export in exchange for 
arms and cash. The imposition of the UN embargo in 1998 and 2000 did little to control 
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the illegal extraction and sale of resource from Liberia and Sierra Leone. Taylor 
eventual accession to Presidency through a post cease-fire election did little to change 
his grip on state resource income. Underground agents from Europe and America in 
particular had become buyers of what become known as blood diamonds from conflict 
zones. Taylor's was compelled to accept exile into Nigeria after revolt by insurgents 
from the Krahn felled his government. Taylor personal income from illicit exports had 
earned him over five times that of the state income per annum. Indeed Taylor had 
involved himself in both the Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire civil wars by targeting the 
mineral resource field for support to rebels rather than the government. 
The Sierra Leone civil war was preceded by a series of military coups. Sankoh master-
minded and organized a civil-military revolution to salvage Sierra Leone from internal 
plundering of the state by politicians and senior military officials. Sankoh is an ex-
convict of an abortive coup in 1981. His conviction was based on his knowledge of the 
plot because he was the camera man for the coup plotters. Sankoh had also met Taylor 
in Libya during his training under Qaddaffi and had contributed as conspirator in 
Taylors' activities in Liberia. Sankor used the situation in Liberia to plan and mobilize 
forces from Sierra Leone citizens captured in Liberia by NPFL. Sankoh was compelled 
by Taylor, in 1991, to advance his attack on Sierra Leone ahead of his own schedule. 
This request was based on the strategic consideration to prevent the consolidation of 
ECOMOG forces, intended to make it impossible for NPFL to capture Monrovia. The 
Sierra Leone TRC Report (Volume 3 item 55 - 65) indicates that Sankoh's motive was 
basically undertaking a revolution in a political and economically abused state; and also 
to seeks vengeance for his imprisonment in 1981, by the government. Sankoh had 
prevented the execution of captured Sierra Leonean citizen in Taylor's camp. A 
confession from an ex-combatant in the TRC report (Vol. 3 item 121) quotes Sankoh 
stating, 
[t]he explanation had been made to us so many times by the Leader himself that 
the old dictatorial regime of the APe is the only tyrant. .. Our targets would not 
be against civilians; nor even against armed men who surrendered. It was just 
rather unfortunate that the war started with a certain group of people who were 
not exposed to that type of ideology. Had it been a warfare started by people 
trained with that understanding, it would not have badly affected civilians in 
that initial phase. 
54 
According to Uzoigwe (1975: 474) the massive supply of guns and powder to coastal 
kings by European traders began another larger predation to capture more slaves from 
the Savannah hinterland groups. It resulted in the commercialization of wars for its 
lucrative benefit in human trade. Therefore the importance of African traditional warfare 
has been its capability of annexation, cheap slave labour and slave exchange for 
economic (material) gains. Jihad kingdoms turned captured slaves into a buffer for 
defence, and excess slaves constituted purchasing power in terms of accessing European 
goods and firearms. The commodification of people for both local and export purposes 
warranted the proliferation of firearms along the coastal belts of Africa and into the 
interior (Roberts 1980: 400). Smith (1988: 105) says, "Warriors were coming 
increasingly to prefer taking captives in battle, as slaves material, rather than to kill or 
maim their enemies". Therefore, trade in slaves and its material and economic benefits 
determined the pace and occurrence of wars before formal colonization. It was therefore 
a period during which neighbours got enriched by enslaving their neighbours for labour 
or exchanged them for some other value. 
4.2. Economic community of West Africa (ECQWAS) conflicts 
West Africa is one of the Africa sub-regions with prolonged major and minor conflicts. 
This occurred mainly in five countries Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote 
d'Ivoire and Nigeria where sporadic religious conflict between Muslims and Christians 
caused destruction of property and death. 
With exception of Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone are endowed with natural and 
mineral resources that, if well administered, are capable of alleviating acute endemic 
poverty in these countries. Cote d'Ivoire has its northern sector seriously 
underdeveloped due to lack of government concern for that area because most of the 
inhabitants are claimed by government as not being full citizens of Cote d'Ivoire 
(Human Rights Watch 2003: 6 - 8). Liberia consists of indigenes and non-indigenous 
group of former freed salves from America. Liberia became independent in 1847 and 
had been one party state ruled by the True Whig Party (TWP) dominated by Americo-
Liberian blacks. Tolbert, the last leader of TWP, was overthrown in a bloody coup and 
murdered by Samuel Doe in October 1980 (Ellis 1995: 175). Doe comes from the 
Krahns (indigenous) group who are less educated, and mostly illiterate, without interest 
52 
The later massacre of civilians began with Taylor's faction, the Special Forces, that 
were assigned to enter Sierra Leone alongside RUF to secure Taylor's interest. This, 
according to the TRC Report alerted Sankoh to the consequence he could not prevent by 
stopping Taylor's combat men involvement in Sierra Leone. There were however some 
of the RUF rebels who, due to the two front attack approach, made monitoring difficult 
for Sankoh and resorted to serious human rights violations. Therefore the TRC Report 
bore credence to the RUF's initial motive as not being greed, but rather concern to use 
peaceful military revolution to salvage a failed state. The TRC report, therefore, 
affirmed that without diamonds the war was inevitable. It is also argued by William 
Reno's (2003: 47; see also UNDP 2005: 34) analysis that, 
... denying resources to armed groups is a necessary but insufficient 
requirement for ensuring that Sierra Leone remains at peace. This task also 
requires addressing grievances that are at the root of popular experiences of 
personalist rule and state collapse. 
The deplorable condition, under which the people lived, indicated that the vast diamond 
resources were in fact lining the pocket of few political-majesties. Indeed civilian and 
military administrations could not have prevented a serious revolt. With ECOMOG and 
the larger international communities' efforts a peaceful deal was reached and RUF 
transformed into a legitimate political party in 1999. However, two intra-state conflicts 
began at this time in Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire. 
In 1999, General Ansoumane Mane attempted to overthrow Vieira of Guinea Bissau a 
war which lasted one year, 2000. The underlying factor was attributed to a failing state 
that could not pay its own army well. General Mane handed over to civilian 
administration after a year's control. During this time, the stalemate around the 
disqualification of Ouattara, former Prime Minister under Houphouet-Boigny, resulted 
in enmity between the southern dominated ruling party and the Northerner Ivorian. The 
Ivorian government is identified as strongly ethnocentric, with Baoule and Bete ethnic 
groups (Pitman 2005), with strong emphasis on what is popularly known as 'Ivorite' or 
'pure Ivorian-ness' (Gberie 2004). The Gbagbo government of the Ivoirian Popular 
Front (FPI) was elected through a controversial election (Crisis Group 2000). The 
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Gbagbo government fanned anti-North sentiment in the south which resulted in the 
attack and killing of some Northerners living in the south. The reprisal resulted in a 
coup attempt which resulted in the murder of former military leaders GueY from the 
Western Cote d'Ivoire. Immediately a rebel group, named the Mouvement pour la 
Justice et la Paix (MJP) (Movement for Justice and Peace) occupied the Northern sector 
and another rebel group, the Mouvement Populaire du Grand Quest (MPIGO) (Popular 
Ivorian Movement for the Great West) occupied the Western sector of Cote d'Ivoire. 
The factors underlying the conflict manifested themselves as political, ethnic, and 
religious. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the southern elite to allow the 
Northerners, who they claimed originated from Burkina Faso and were predominantly 
Muslims, to accede to Presidency. The animosity turned into serious conflict by 
government actors and the military (and the southern citizens, in some cases) led to a 
violent Northern revolt in 2002. During this period of conflicts a number of civilians 
lost their lives during both government and rebels' attacks. Also, natural resource fields 
such as diamond mines and export commodities such as cocoa, were taken over by 
rebels. Gbagbo was viewed as nuisance to France and has been politically isolated with 
new favour directed towards Ouattara, the northerner ex-Vice President under 
Houphouet-Boigny regime. Gbagbo has, due to his socialist inclinations been opening 
the door to China and also for US favours (Diop 2005). This irated the former colonial 
lord and strained the existing relationship between the two states. Attempted 
resettlement negotiations through ECOWAS, AU and UN failed with the inevitable re-
postponement of the October 2006 scheduled multiparty election, due to Gbagbo's 
insistence on citizen voter registration issues until a recent arrangement, through the 
mediation of Banny, the interim Prime Minister. 
In 1999, Mane attempted overthrow of Vieira of Guinea-Bissau which turned into a war 
lasting one year. The underlying factor was that the "political rivalry" and "general 
discontent" of failing state (Chabal 2002: 56). Mane handed power over to civilian 
administration after a year of control. Currently, there is an on-going impasse between 
The Gambia and Senegal over intra-state destabilization issues. Gambia accused 
Senegal Wadi of harbouring political fugitives accused of attempted coup plots. The 
Gambian government raised on international outcry that the Senegal Head of state, Wadi, 
was behind the plot to oust him from leadership. Again, Jammeh, accused Wadi of 
interference in Guinea-Bissau with same intension to oust the government there. Whilst 
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J ammeh trace Wadi's intension back two years ago, the claim is that Senegal is also 
being supported by French and the US. There are two considerations that either this 
issue is taken up as significant early warning to avert another complex stalemate 
conflict in the Sene-Gambian enclave; or Gambia shall be compelled to resort to arming 
to the teeth to counteract suspected insurgents from Senegal. Jammeh therefore has 
resorted to revive the Cassamance rebellion to cause unrest to Senegal government 
(Freedom Newspaper June 11, 2007). 
4.3. The Great Lakes Region 
After quasi-independence from France in 1960, Chad had its first civil war in 1965 due 
to insurgency from the North to overthrow a non-democratic southern authority. The 
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibetsi (BET) -region had raised many rebel activities led by the 
Zaghawa people. The imposition of higher tax, which sparked riots in villages of 
Mangalme, had resulted in a wide spread revolt in most part of the North. There have 
been power struggle, that is intermingled with North (mainly Muslims) and South 
(mainly Christians and Traditional) enmity over ethnic and religious differences. This 
period also saw the external interference of Libya in particular and then France and 
American interventions due to territorial issues, such as the Libyan purchase of the 
Aousou strip. In 1975, Chad fell into a state of anarchy between military rivals after the 
overthrowing of Tombalbaye. The military leaders Gen. Malloum, Goukouni and 
Habre wrestled until eventually Habre became Head of State. In 1990 Habre was 
replaced by Deby a Northerner with the help of Qaddafi. This was made possible 
because according to Fearon and Laitin (2006: 21), 
.. . French withdrew their support for Habn! because of his closeness to the 
Americans in general and in particular, because he granted oil concessions to 
American companies. 
The French had allowed Qaddafi favouritism over their effort to normalize the 
relationship with Libya for oil advantage. At this stage Chad's oil prospects were not 
that promising. Unfortunately, the American government under Bush was involved in 
another oil field salvation mission in Kuwait. This made it easy for Qaddafi to enthrone 
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Deby (and Humphreys (2005: 509) and gamer other support from Elf Petroleum in 
France). But several insurgency groups continued to be formed such as Forces Armees 
pour la Republique Federale (FARF) in 1994, Mouvement pour la Democratie et la 
Justice au Tchad (MDJT) was formed in 1998. Deby instituted democratic system 
which Fearon and Laitin (2006: 18) described as a sham to forestall the consequence of 
a weakened state. John Prendergast (2007: 1) agreed with the former authors that the 
Chad democracy failed because the "governments came to power militarily, pay lip-
service to democracy, and fail to provide basic services to their citizens". Now Deby's 
determination to entrench his reign also attracts more rebellion from, 
rebel groups included dissidents from the inner circles of power and Deby's 
Zaghawa people who seek to distance themselves from Deby's costly failures and 
to maintain their prominence in the country's leadership, the FUCD appears 
determined to remove Zaghawa influence in Chad altogether (prendergast 2007: 4). 
The Chadian conflict therefore does not reflect the greediness of internal rebels but the 
complex situations of the weak state and the politics of patronage together with strained 
ethnic relationships and state failure which is also beset with foreign interests such as 
Libya, Sudan and America. According to Reno (2002: 13), 
Chad's extremely weak state institutions and fragmented patronage 
network have generated a plethora of temporary political alliances of 
opponents, rebels groups, and ambitious local strongmen. 
The situation in Chad will therefore continue without crude oil because the root of 
the conflict was created by the colonial ineffectiveness to unite the country. The 
manner of personality politics then worsened the political quagmire rather than 
galvanising nationalism and uniting Chad. Such a condition is required for peaceful 
resolution of their differences and a suitable political system. Chad requires a 
democracy that guarantees power sharing rather than the current majoritarian 
environment that it is easily hijacked by the leader and supporters. 
Sudan's internal conflict started before the discovery of crude oil in the southern part of 
the country. After independence in 1956, racial and religious conflict existed between 
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the northern Afro-Arab community around (39% of the population) and the black 
community in the south. Scott Peterson (2000: 178) has criticized the colonial 'divide 
and rule' policy as a source of racial conflict in Sudan: 
Following the time-honored practice of divide and rule, Britain encouraged 
north and south differences and legally enforced them to prevent any rise of 
nationalism. 
The colonial endorsed segregation based on race led to the exclusion of the south from 
contributing to the first Sudan constitution since independence. The racial and religious 
superiority felt by the Afro-Arab community has lead to the enforcement of 
'Arabization' of the blacks as a formal state policy. This policy enables the Arabs, who 
are minority to "control state power, provides the majority of the political elite, 
dominates the armed forces, the bureaucracy, commerce, banking, trade, and the 
judiciary" as a means to subdue other cultures and beliefs (Uzodike 2004: 297; Reno 
2002: 14, 16,22 - 24; International Crisis Group 2006: 4). 
The Bashir government's religious extremism as the National Islamic Fronts (NIF) 
imposition of Sharia without a national referendum was an affront to the majority non-
Muslim citizens in the south. This resulted in armed conflict from 1983 until 2005. The 
government between 1989 and 1994, replaced about 73,000 professionals with religious 
extremist supporters of the party. Furthermore the effort of the government to re-
demarcate the southern boundaries to secure the oil and mineral lands was unacceptable. 
These issues, coupled with the excessive development marginalization where Southern 
Sudan received only 23.6% of the allocated development fund, resulted in starvation. 
The new policy was resisted through violence by the formation of SPLMA led by 
Garang. The Sudan conflict therefore cannot be qualified as a greed, though its has 
crude oil as a later contributing factor (Reno 2002, Lado (undated), International Crisis 
Group 2006, Seymour 2002: 18-19). 
Between Chad, Sudan and Somalia, the upsurge in intra-state conflict from the issues 
involved can be attributed to unresolved local critical issues. They form mainly political 
and diversity (ethnic, racial, and religious) issues. Dealing with these problems requires 
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both national and international support to adequately determine a balanced and 
satisfactory resolution. It is evident that at the national level individual leaders in both 
Chad and Sudan, by their own idiosyncrasy, have become obstacles to resolving critical 
issues such as ethnic and religious differences. The systemic and regional actors tend to 
express an interest in the economic implications of national issues. The external actors 
took advantage of political and non-political cleavages to pursue interest in Chad and 
Sudan. In fact, the Anglo-Franco policy of 'divide and rule' for economic exploitation, 
has proven to be an effective time-bomb for social disintegration. If the grievance issues 
had been resolved earlier with the encouragement of the international and regional 
organizations, the conflicts would have possible ceased. The development of animosity 
together with other issues, have complicated the state of both Chad and Sudan wars as 
well as that of Somalia. The answer to the Chad, Sudan, and Somalia conflicts rest with 
the reduction of external parties interests, which also amounts to greed after economic 
resources. Systemic greed is serious obstacle to any local effort to resolve internal 
conflict. 
The Great Lakes region has experienced pre-1990 violent political conflicts. However 
the DRC conflict has the extra-dimension valuable resource unlike Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi. The politics of patronage by the Seseko regime from the early independent 
period ran Zaire into context of official 'rent-seeking' and economic mismanagement. 
America and Russia contested furiously the control of the zone with oil and diamond 
wealth. Places like Rwanda and Burundi though without massive resources, experienced 
conflict due to colonial 'divide and rule' policy, sowing seeds of enmity for today's 
turmoil among the few ethnic indigenes. Uganda was the first to experience significant 
human rights violations targeted at political opponents people from their ethnic groups. 
That political instability, with its related human rights abuses reached its peak with 
Amin's military regime in the 1970s. From Amins' period to Obote saw the massacre of 
around 600, 000 people, including foreigners. The ethnic and political complexities that 
have resulted in the past politically motivated carnage, have been attributed to the nature 
of British rule and the legacy left. A diplomatic report states that, 
Colonial development exploited these differences, bringing people from the 
centre and west into commerce and employment in the administration and using 
people from the north and east mainly as labour and in the army. This laid down 
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a pattern of inequality between a poorer north and a richer centre that persists 
today, aggravated by unresolved internal and external conflicts (Royal Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). 
It appears colonial political legacies have laid the foundation for anned violence to aid 
in facilitating unjust economic exploitation, and this is ignored by the greed theorists. 
The emerging leaders did not change the rule of force and brutality in governance with 
Obote regime (Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 95). But Busumtwi-Sam argues Obote's regime 
attempts to hold post-independence leaders culpable, but the evidence goes beyond the 
behaviour of those personalities. Similar policies have also characterized the Somali 
conflict where the imposed democracy by Italy has served to divide the clans and the 
struggle to practice western fonn of democracy has left Somalia in an unending bloody 
fiasco (Uzodike 2004: 294, 295). Nader and Grande (2002: 587) confinn that the 
imposition of imported ruling (legal) systems created a conflict of interest and continues 
to sustain such confusion of anarchy in places like Somalia. 
The history of the Great Lakes region had served as the foundation of subsequent post-
1990s anned conflicts that have engulfed the zone. The protracted anned rebellion by 
the Lord's Resistant Anny (LRA) led by Kony and Otti whose mission had been to 
overthrow the Museveni government for overthrowing the Acholi-Ied military 
government in 1986. There had been the other factor of LRA seeking to install a theocratic 
state in Uganda which turns away from murder of civilians and abduction of children, 
using girls as sex slaves and the indiscriminate damage to property. The post-modem 
world has witnessed massive genocide in Rwanda due to political and ethnic insecurity. 
Stein (2001 : 190, 191, 192) describes the behaviour as "enemy image", a stereotype 
complex of contextual factors such as group belief which entrenches negative 
perceptions that estrange groups to each other or by a group upon another. 'Enemy 
image' can be transfonned politically through positive leadership. Stein cited the case of 
Sadat who whose effort turned Israel from having an enemy status which impacted on 
Egyptian policy on Israel after Sadat's assassination. The assassination of Habyarimana 
in April 1994, unleashed a "holocaust" with almost a million people killed within three 
months in Rwanda. Petterson implicated the colonial method of 'divide and rule' as 
significant factor that continued to force a wedge between the two main ethnic groups. 
Therefore at the onset of the civil attacks on Tutsis, "French interest went far beyond 
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keeping up its reputation as African adventurers .... proved to be the main bulwark of 
the Hutu regime" (Peterson 2000: 280, 281). Frances' alignments with the Hutus 
compelled Museveni to give his "blessings" to Tutsis in the Ugandan army who 
reorganized to defend their neighbouring-kins in Rwanda. 
This was extended to Burundi as the same two ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis turned 
arms upon each other over political issues. This conflict was not limited to Rwanda and 
Burundi with cross-border insurgencies of rebels who shared the same ethnicity as 
people in the DRC ( Kigali for example). The concurrent conflicts within the states in 
the Great Lakes enclave resulted in a serious spill over from Rwanda into Burundi, 
DRC and Uganda for example, due to geographic convenience. Rebels easily found 
homes in next neighbouring states intensifying the political distrust. Also the sense of 
destabilization in the same area, by political leaders, influenced some to secretly extend 
military favours to a particular side (Stein 2001 : 195). The conflicts of DRC and Angola 
included major sub-regional parties embroiled in what is described as internationalized 
conflict, due to the nature of spill over and interests (Human Security Centre 2005: 20). 
South Africa, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia on one side and Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi on the other eastern frontiers of DRC. In Angola, South Africa and 
Namibia played an active role in fighting alongside UNITA and the government forces 
respectively (Batchelor et al 2002: 341, 342). The involvement of most of the 
economically struggling SADC neighbours had resulted in an increase in military 
expenditure in that period (see p. 19). This was due to the economic and political sense 
of the conflict, and the role of crude oil and mineral resources. Human Sciences 
Research Council (2006: 6) report has confirmed this by identifying foremost, politics, 
economic and ideology as underlying issues. 
Angola and the DRC civil wars had its roots in the Cold War, American-Russian 
economic and ideological expansionism. The reason for a conflict starting and for it 
continuing can be different (Collier et al partly alluded to this by distinguishing between 
trigger causes and underlying causes). The superpower expansionist interest in Africa 
has had much to do with resource endowment. Therefore the clash of America and 
Russia over Angola and DRC was inevitable given the two states natural resources and 
the need for early effective intervention in Rwanda. According to Tshitereke (2003: 86), 
rebels such as Mobuto and Jonas Savimbi had received massive support from America 
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and its allies in the West to overthrow constitutional governments. Whilst the DRC was 
successful in removing constitutional government it served as an initial foundation for 
subsequent political instability. Eduardo Dos Santos' support from the former Soviet 
Union and Cuba served as formidable resistance against the Western motivated rebellion 
of Savimbi's Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Tshitereke again 
says, "President Ronald Reagan invited him [Savimbi] to the White House and hailed 
him as a freedom fighter ... ". Today the same 'freedom fighters' with the same level of 
looting and devastation are unfortunately branded as "criminals" and motivated by 
"greed". This does not forgive the atrocities that characterized many of African civil 
wars. However the issue to be raised is that systemic greed explains the complex nature 
of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa (M0ller 2004: 19; Agbese 1999: 225). The post-
Cold War era from 1990s, only changed the focus of the struggle from ideological to 
"economic interests" and "motivated by greed"-often more devastating to citizens. This 
also speaks to the opportunity war opens for elites and rebel leaders alike to establish 
themselves economically on a global scene through irregular trade market with 
destinations in the West (Tshitereke 2003: 87; Willet 2004: 109, Ill). 
The late Mobuto's demoralised government by promoting patronage and the wholesale 
promotion of rent services in state institutions, coupled with a mismanaged economy 
which pauperized the majority of Zairian citizens. The ineffectiveness of the Zairian 
government resulted in a collapse of the state and a lack of development, despite the 
high level of resources. The military intervention in the late 1990s Mobuto's exile under 
the leadership of the late Kabila is noted to have had external influence and support. The 
later days of Mobuto saw him estranged from his friends in the West. The involvement 
of external interests had resulted in Kabila receiving £30 million from a South African 
consortium, Namibian businesses, and the Namibian government (Willet 2004: 111). 
Kabila, confronted with fierce opposition by other rebel forces despite Mobuto's exit, is 
an example of the economic centre of the conflict. His assassination and replacement by 
his son, Kabila has not changed the conflictual nature of the DRC because of the high 
level external systemic influences. These external actors derive higher gains from an 
unregulated market in the conflictual state of the DRC. The issues surrounding the DRC 
and Angolan civil wars intensified because of the post-Cold War change from 
ideological struggle into a purely economic one. The systemic greed that was evident 
had two dimensions: acquiring cheaper resources from these conflict-ridden states, and 
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the arms trade (Agbese 1999: 229). Internally, the DRC and Angolan warring parties 
refused to cooperate because of the economic factors. The decline in intensity, for 
example the Angolan war, indicates the conflict-fatigue period when Savimbi began to 
negotiate a power-sharing deal. The post-democratic election in DRC in 2006 has not 
offered a thorough peace, with the opposition leader in exile after fatal post-election 
clashes and a number of rebel factions hiding in the bush. The local warlords' greed 
factor over diamonds and other resources received external motivation by conflict 
entrepreneurs on a systemic level. 
4.4. Summary 
This review of the intra-state conflicts indicates that the majority originated from 
grievance complaints. Pre-colonial raiding of people and property in Africa exhibit 
greedy symptoms but have no link to the current manner of new wars with its 
unprincipled destruction of civilian lives. Colonization modernized weaponry and made 
local wars economically lucrative. With the new conflicts, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, 
and Guinea Bissau cannot be part of the greed perspective irrespective of the incidences 
of resources plundered. The role of natural resources has been a critical means to 
finance the conflict. Natural resource in a state where conflict ensues creates disorder 
for plundering. In the Chadian and Sudanese conflicts the precedents of the internal 
conflicts makes it difficult to use the greed barometer. However, the presence of 
resources has intensified the struggle between the government and rebel factions in 
Chad. The DRC and Angolan civil wars involve strong elements of greed. The nature of 
the greed extends beyond individual agendas but is influenced systemically from 
external actors. The Cold War eras territorial struggle underlies these two major 
conflicts in that sub-region. Therefore, it is not an anomaly to describe the majority of 
intra-state conflicts as an outright continuation of politics, but from a non-professional 
military force. Therefore in quoting Meller (2004: 11), "most wars can have a host of 
different motives, they may be said to be military actions for the creation of public 
goods. Whether they deserve this label also depends on whether they succeed in actually 
mitigating the humanitarian problems in question, and whether the costs of doing so 
(e.g. measured in terms of human lives) compare favourably with the gains". 
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It is difficult at this stage to credit any of the civil wars in West Africa, Central Africa, 
Great Lakes Region and Southern Africa, as contributing to public good. They have 
undermined the development of the Africa region and created problems such as the 
destruction of families, refugees, spread of diseases, famine, environmental degradation, 
destruction of infrastructure, and economic decline in states. In the long-run the parties 
had to rely on negotiation for settlement. It appears that if it was not for greed, the 
parties would have relied on negotiation from the beginning. In the same manner once 
promptings for negotiation failed, most agrieved parties resorted to violent struggle and 
eventually a war. 
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Chapter Five 
5. The implications of the causes of war debates for milex 
This chapter, pulls together the issues and the implications of the parts raised in the 
previous chapters. The policy implications of the grievance and greed debate for 
conflict resolution and prevention are discussed. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
two discourses and the impact on defence decision-making will be explored. The impact 
of the debates on economic and social development as human security will be evaluated. 
5.1. Evaluation of SSA conflicts 
The lack of an appropriate theory to explain the phenomena of wars, generally, has 
contributed to the recurring incidences and ineffective armed conflict resolution 
mechanisms. The ineffectiveness of weak theory has been attributed to the lack of valid 
data and testing. Therefore the work of Sorokin, Richardson, Quincy, Boulding, Burton, 
Kelman, Galtung among others, in creating scientific data mechanisms for conflict 
research contributed to providing the systematic basis to predict wars and take the 
necessary steps to prevent a recurrence. As the evidence shows, new African civil wars 
have defied previous models used in predicting interstate conflicts and Western models 
of wars, due to differences in underlying factors and contextual issues of the two worlds. 
Democratic models that have been effective in preventing civil wars in Europe have 
proven to have an opposite tracked record in Africa. The fast-track (track one) 
mediation methods of conflict resolution has been effective in the West, but has failed to 
prevent recurrence of new wars in emerging states Africa (Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen 
2000). It has not been capable of unifying the differences but enforcement of agreement 
that hardly resolve the conflict (Ury et al 1988). We have found that most of the 
theoretical literature that has been produced repeats the same trend of expanding weak 
theories due to weak data mostly based on assumption. The relevance of appropriate and 
valid data underscores the soundness of a theory (Ross 2004; Rosser 2006). Waltz effort 
in creating appropriate framework for restoring confidence in International Relations, 
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centres on how best to fonnulate a sound theory based on accurate data and validity 
testing of variables. A weak untested hypothesis lends itself not only as inappropriate, 
but also as misinfonning decision-making. There is the need for high profile researchers 
to seek valid empirical evidence and improved familiarization with African context 
Issues. 
Pre-colonial local wars showed no link in principles with regard to new civil wars in 
Africa. However, slavery and its material and economic benefits determined the pace and 
occurrence of wars before fonnal colonization. It became a period during which 
neighbours became enriched by enslavement of their neighbours, which resulted in 
distrust. The possible contribution made to new intra-state conflicts could be an 
entrenched enemy stereotype which has caused a wedged between ethnic groups and 
weaker clans and visibly influenced the pattern of ethnic and racial dominance of 
democratization in Africa. Another significant factor is the role of fireanns which 
intensified the level of raiding and resistance. Whilst the suppliers benefited enonnously, 
the increasing weapon proliferation by European traders impacted negatively on the 
politics and economic production in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lovejoy 2000: 161; Manning 
1994: 156; Owusu - Sekyere 2005: 56 - 59). 
The profile of the West African conflicts revealed preferences, perception and attitudes 
of individual leaders, state failure, regional and systemic biases and interests, all 
contributing and shaping issues towards provocation and violence. The systemic and 
regional interest had numerous implications for the beginning and prolonging of the 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire conflicts. In the case of Liberia, America is said 
to have offered Doe's regime more financial aid than any other country in the region 
that time (Agbese 1999: 227, 228). Why then did America allow its 'favourite' African 
state to plunge into such intractable civil war? We also find without the support of 
Qaddaffi, Campoare, and Houphouet-Boigny, it would have been difficult for Taylor to 
rule on Liberia. Just as other leaders in the ECOWAS sub-region perceive the threat of 
Taylor to regional stability, Libya, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso would not have 
fallen back on violent means of removing Doe. Those who offered the full support 
therefore cannot be dissociated from what happened in the destabilized countries. The 
individual political and non-political actor alone is incapability to wage war without 
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external factors contributing enormously. What the Sierra Leone TRC Report (Vol III 
item 6) revealed against the greed theory is that, 
... the civil war in Sierra Leone was not simply a struggle for mineral resources. 
There were other factors that laid the grounds for the war which would have 
taken place even without the existence of diamonds in the country. 
Therefore conclusions can be drawn which may be problematic for the idea that 
warlords cause civil war. The use of excessive force meant a huge increase in arms costs 
(Mack 2002: 523). The report added that the presence of the mineral resources served 
only to "fuel" the conflict by providing a source of funding, but this was not the core 
issue. Similarly, the Kosovo genocide attempted 'ethnic cleansing' of Serbs and Croat 
Muslims and is evident of the level identity and political insecurity which could trigger 
intra-state armed violence and war based on the 'enemy image' crisis. There is the 
evidence of the intolerance of diversities and animosity building out of the failing state. 
Such intolerance can be an explosive rebellion against political institutions, dominant 
ethnic groups, religious superiority, and racial groups (Stein 2001 : 190, 192, 193). 
In Cote d'Ivoire, Guel's death invoked a vindictive sentiment in the Western region of 
the country bordering Liberia. In that area the evidence showed that Taylor supported to 
MPIGO to overthrow the party that has supported him previously through its former late 
leader (Human Rights Watch 2005: 11, 29). Here Taylor's attraction to mineral 
resources is clearly manifested in how the attraction overrides other crucial common-
sense political considerations. The nature of the MPIGO campaign and the destructive 
nature of their campaign is more than a vindictive display. The indication is that the 
involvement of ex-Taylor supporters and former RUF militias is evident. They looted 
resources and were involved in rape. This evidence amounts to gross human rights 
violation and war crimes. However, in the Cote d'Ivoire conflict, three main factors are 
the basis of their behaviour that culminated in an upsurge of rebel activities. The 
controversial issue of identity of authentic Cote d'Ivoire citizen, which focused on the 
exclusion of northerners demanded fierce resistance; (not necessarily violence as 
happened by the manner of government violent response to the northern occupation by 
rebels). The revenge of Guel's death would satisfy the Western rebels; and French 
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lassie-faire with Gbagbo's administration constituted the isolation of Gbagbo's 
government (Washington Post 2004). 
The patterns of conflicts in the analysis lead to the assertion that individual warlord's 
greed per se could not have plunged the states involved into such protracted civil wars. 
Other scholarly arguments indicate disloyalty among rebels, which could have caused 
the eventual dispersal and weakening of the rebel force. There were indisputable 
grievance issues based on political failure, structural issues that lead to ethnic 
marginalization and discrimination, and also the economic pillaging by the elite in some 
cases. Whilst Taylor's overt excess amounted to greediness this alone could not have 
enabled him to attack Liberia and subsequently Sierra Leone. The underlying factors go 
beyond local grievance to regional grievance that invokes the support of other states and 
systemic apathy by America. We need to admit the general complexity of what actually 
underlies civil wars. Currently, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal fracas over 
internal revolts show the complex nature of the causal dynamics that start with all kinds 
of counter accusations by internal and external parties. 
The greed theory makes is made more difficult to identify when developing states 
conflicts viewed as fundamentally criminal. In as much as greed theory has gained 
influence and categorized new wars as pure criminality, this rational assumption, backed 
by the examples cited, still make it difficult with other recently documented reports. For 
instance, the Powell and Yahya (2006) report does not indicate resources as a basic 
causal reason of conflicts in West Africa. The evidence in the document also indicates 
that resources are contributing factors and serve to fuel conflict rather than starting them. 
In the case of the Cote d'Ivoire conflict, the document disproved that diamonds, for 
instance, are a major source of income for the rebels. Other exportable commodities 
such as cocoa, coffee, timber and cotton revenues are used by the rebels. The evidence 
available shows that the rebels actually use the revenues for their survival and 
replenishing needed weaponry, the motive for their rebellion could then simply be the 
criminal onslaught on the general citizens. Nevertheless, war cannot be sensible given 
its manner of destruction, especially where there is ethical disconnection which has 
been evident with many non-professional rebels, mostly poor uneducated young boys. 
Between Chad, Sudan and Somalia, the upsurge in intra-state conflict resulting from the 
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issues involved can be attributed to unresolved critical local issues. They were mainly 
political and diversity issues (ethnic, racial, and religious). Dealing with some of these 
problems requires both national and international support to adequately work on a 
balanced and satisfactory resolution. It is evident that at the national level, individual 
leaders in both Chad and Sudan, by their own idiosyncrasy, have become obstacles to 
resolving these critical issues. The systemic and regional actors tend to express an 
interest in the economic implications of national issues and have taken advantage of the 
cleavages to pursue their interest. The Anglo-Franco policy of 'divide and rule' for 
economic exploitation, has proven to be an effective time-bomb for social disintegration. 
If the grievance issues had been resolved earlier, with the encouragement and support of 
the international and regional organizations, the conflicts could have ceased. The 
development of animosity complicated the states of Chad and Sudan as well as that of 
Somalia. The answer to the Chadian, Sudanese, and Somali conflicts, rest with the 
reduction of international actors' interests, which also amount to greed over economic 
resources. The systemic greed is a serious obstacle to any local effort to resolve internal 
conflict (Roeber 2005: 21, 22; Mack 2002: 522). 
With Southern African conflicts, the issues surrounding the DRC and Angola civil wars 
intensified because of the post-Cold War demise of the political ideological struggle into 
purely economic struggle. The systemic greed had two ways of acquiring cheaper 
resources from these conflict-ridden states, and indeed the arms trade was vital to the 
Western arms industry (Agbese 1999: 229). Internally, DRC and Angolan warring 
parties refused to cooperate because of these economic factors. The decline in intensity 
of for example, the Angola war, indicates the conflict-fatigue period when Savimbi 
began to negotiate a power-sharing deal. The post-democratic election in DRC in 2006 
has not offered sustainable peace, with the opposition leader in exile after post-election 
clashes. Indeed the local greedy warlords get external motivation by conflict 
entrepreneurs within the international arena and developed countries. 
The conflicts of the DRC and Angola brought major sub-regional parties embroiled in 
what is described as internationalized conflict, due to the nature of mixed interests 
(Human Security Centre 2005: 20). South Africa, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia 
on one side and Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi on the other eastern frontiers ofDRC. In 
Angola, South Africa and Namibia had played an active role in fighting alongside 
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UNITA and the government forces respectively (Batchelor et al 2002: 341, 342). The 
involvement of most of the economically struggling SADC neighbours had incurred an 
increase in military expenditure during that period (see figure 4). This was due to the 
economic political nature of the conflict, and the role of crude oil and mineral resource. 
It could be inferred that the Zimbabwean political stalemate has not erupted into armed 
conflict because the SADC neighbours have learnt their lesson in DRC. None of the 
SADC states have dared to contribute arms or allowed arms passage through their 
territory. Therefore the importance of external actors is required to make civil war 
possible. Human Sciences Research Council Report (2006: 6) identifies foremost, 
politics, economy and ideological interests as underlying issues in SADC conflicts. The 
Zimbabwe opposition, without military aid from any regional party cannot mobilize an 
armed response to Mugabe's tyranny. The lack of any SADC members' intervention has 
prevented an armed alternative to topple Mugabe's entrenched regime. As neither war 
nor pressure resistance provides a short-cut to a resolution, the later eliminates 
excessive cost of post war reconstruction. 
5.2. The greed hypothesis and implications for milex 
a) On the international policy platform 
The greed hypothesis' strength as espousing greed as the only causal factor to rebel wars 
lies in its ability to raise concern about the possible negative human behaviour during 
rebellion. It also helps policy-makers, avoid trivializing the availability of primary 
commodities as potential source of peace, but rather as potential for armed conflict in 
the state, if there is over dependence on such resources. It draws the international 
community's awareness to external illegal market that provides an avenue for the illegal 
exploitation of mineral resources in conflict states. The hypothesis has an influence on 
the various impositions of an embargo on "blood diamond" as diamonds from conflict 
zones with the Kimberly Certification Process Scheme (KCPS), and other natural 
resources such as timber from countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia to starve rebel 
forces of income (Ursino and Kamaludeen 2005: 10). It also raises the need of more aid 
to conflict prone states to help the governments meet their commitments, thus 
increasing their defence spending and aid to ultimately pressure rebels to abandon the 
war. At this juncture some of the significant weakness with greed model will be 
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considered. The following raises some of the main weakness of the greed econometric 
hypothesis which gives the wrong signal to security preferences based on intense 
military security: 
1. The argument with gnevance carnes much of Western perceptions and 
misconceptions of political attitudes, behaviour and social idiosyncrasies in SSA 
which can hastily trigger violence such as religious and ethnic oppression. 
11 . Putting blame for wars on rebels and labelling them criminals shift focus from 
human security to absolute state security as the main guarantee of stability. 
111. The need for donor countries to consider military security conditionality with 
financial aid to African states becomes crucial (Mack 2002: 522). 
IV. Arms importation is given priority in the executive agenda to: i) safeguard 
government protection, ii) symbol to attract investment, iii) guarantee protection 
to existing state and foreign investment, and iv) policy of resistance of non-
cooperation by governments in the event of conflict due to presence of military. 
v. It also intensifies the arms trade whereby bribery of African government officials 
becomes inevitable as arms manufacturers take advantage of conflicts. 
VI. The policy of arms companies' bribery protection is also justified as economic 
interest concerns. The bribery induces excessive weapons procurement and 
expense on military personnel that affect other social sectors. This has the 
enormous potential to open the way for "global instability" which normally 
happens in the developing world, such as Africa (Roeber 2005: 21). 
V11. Greed proponents frown at economic dependency through globalization policies 
of unfair trade balance of current international economy. That has resulted in the 
economic non-performance of African states. The crisis that evolves and explodes 
into violence is totally attributed to rebellion. Stewart (2001: 2, 3, 17, 18, 19, 32, 
33) shows that inequality, nevertheless, causes critical social imbalances that can 
lead to political violence. 
b) Resources can generate war: Regional policy impact 
Greed hypothesis has a negative influence at the level of regional spheres of Africa -
especially with emphasis on resources as the only security threat: 
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1. Such a resource scare could lead to a regional security dilemma by increasing 
armament, which contributes to regional distrust and destabilization. 
11. The involvement of regional parties in promoting and supporting rebellion is 
attributed only to rebels. That makes conflict resolution elusive for the entire 
regIOn. 
111. With the intensification of regional militarization, the proliferation of small arms 
and criminal activities increases. 
c) State 
The greed hypothesis acknowledging resource induced patronage by state actors 
however the greed hypothesis: 
1. Trivializing the critical issue of degeneration of human security and the resultant 
human rights violation that in itself undermines state security through revolt. 
11. The acute abuses of human rights by state actors are treated as potential root 
factor to violent uprisings in African states (Thoms and Ron 2006: 46, 47). State 
failure is not the only institutional shortfall, but the inability to provide 
protection to citizens with divergent policy views is, in itself, anarchy according 
to Hobbes and Rousseau. 
111. The loci of policy priority is misdirected and wrongly focused on state assets 
security requires intensive militarization rather than human security (Harris 
2004). Such a misguided policy will serve to intensify the conflict or promotes 
its reoccurrence if human rights issues remain secondary on agenda. This also 
leads to state actors reinforcing structural mechanisms, such as voting structures, 
which make the state the absolute provider with excessive statism dependency. 
Once this is materially and economically difficult, it leads to policy failure. 
IV. The patronage governments, without any purported grievance, may use the full 
strength of the military and state funds without any need for properly account to 
conduct "raiding" and "terror" by state forces upon its own citizens in e.g. 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Rwanda and Zimbabwe among others (Azam 
and Hoeffier 2002: 482; Agbese 1999: 233; Human Rights Watch 2005: 14 - 23). 
v. The greed hypothesis with its 'economist' perspective, therefore, validates the 
existence of the state without counting how some state leaders mismanage their 
economies and violate human rights (Fjelde 2006: 6). That happens to push 
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forward state actors' parochial interest which can be either ethnic interest or 
religious, as it is happening in Uganda, Sudan and Somalia (Brown 2001: 219 -
220). The Sierra Leone government, running the state aground, have not been 
accused of criminality which leads to other emerging forms of armed violence 
and retaliation by non-state actors. 
VI. Greed perception could lead to biased analytical basis which according to 
Mehler (2005: 13) "could lead to short-sighted and contradictory policies by 
national governmental and international organizations". 
d) Individual 
The radical indiscriminate categorization of all rebel leaders as criminals lends serious 
weakness to the theory by making them all "greedy predators": 
1. This instils in the government an adversarial (enemy image) stance. Despite 
greed hypothesis claim there are no means provided by the theory to assess 
motives. 
11. The sense of bias against non-state actors exonerates governing leaders' motives 
and their impact on the political landscape, sometimes resulting in human rights 
violations and that does not measure up to criminality of the state. These are 
questions greed proponents do not answer because of their perception that the 
causes of new conflicts are a commodity than policy issue. 
5.3. The implication for human development of the grievance hypothesis 
The strength of the grievance hypothesis, generally, is its diverse scope of combining 
various factors rather than limiting its analysis to a single issue: 
1. The grievance hypothesis is significant for its multi-perspective analytical 
approach to conflict analysis. It therefore helps to dissect a conflict from broad-
range of factors from the international to individual and social structures to 
institutions. It therefore helps in quicker prediction of conflict. The grievance 
model facilitates easily recognizable signals as integrated-early-warning to avert 
full-blown conflict. Urvin (2001: 16, 17) explain early-warning as observable 
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attitudes and patterns of changes. Gambia currently shows early signals of 
possible revolt possibly with external support. Making it a rebel issue will imply 
recourse to arms alert but the Jammeh government needs to consider its 
entrenchment. 
11. Grievance helps in taking the necessary early response through the preventive 
diplomatic process. The latter is essential to avert the enormous cost of 
international humanitarian aid, peace-keeping, and protracted resolution 
procedures which demand lot of funds, so too do cost of post-conflict 
reconstruction after massive destructions of infrastructure (Mack 2002: 522, 523). 
111. There is the evidence that many grievance proponents advocate for increased 
cuts in milex and recommend political reform, better power-sharing democratic 
practice, and discourage extensive incumbency of elected leaders. 
a) Regional systems and grievance 
Grievance at the regional level has similar significance for security as the global level. 
The theory: 
1. Enhances integrated-early-warning and post-conflict DDR to avert full-blown 
conflict and its recurrence (Urvin 2001: 16, 17; M011er 2004: 17; Lederach 2002: 
80, 81). With the exception of the conflicts that have historical antecedents, most 
of the new civil wars could have been averted if the early signals have been 
recognized. 
11. Considering the grievance hypothesis, some of Africa's sub-regions are erecting 
mechanisms based on grievance issues to signal a potential conflict in states. In 
West Africa, an early response intervention base has been set in Sierra Leone, 
whilst the civil society and grassroots are being educated on the detection of 
early warning conflict symptoms. These initiatives can help in managing, 
mitigating and preventing violent conflict in Africa region. 
b) Grievance and the state 
At the national or state level the grievance position on the causes of new wars informs 
policy-makers of micro-issues that have relevance for political stability. 
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1. Grievance informs policy-makers to consider a protective state, which is 
cardinal to peace-building and confidence ins·piring. Indeed, the pursuit of a 
military arsenal and maintenance of a large army is for peace and stability which 
can be achieved at a less a cost by meeting provisions for human and 
environmental well-being. Such structural preventive measures can forestall 
operation prevention which can be too late (M011er 2004: 21). 
11. The factors of democracy being the cause of war conform to Levy's system 
(broader factors) approach. At the national level of state formation and transition 
failure, fragmentation of the nation-state in globalization, elements of economic 
exploitation draws on systemic support in the form of military aid. 
111. The theory is cautious of across-the-board criminalization of non-state actors in 
civil war, and this makes it a very conducive premise to initiate proactive, pre-
emptive and integrated approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building. 
The theory recognizes the legitimacy of both actors embroiled in civil war, and 
that facilitates the use of dialogue and integrative or multi-track negotiation. 
Peace-building focus achieving consensus among all parties makes it an optimal 
policy choice. Francis (2004: 62) agrees that it is decision type which places 
humans as the agent that shape the future which is not fixed. The strategic nature 
of peace-building as positive-peace with a long-term view of conflict, makes it a 
better policy informant for new wars conflict resolution. 
c) Leadership critical focus of grievance 
The grievance hypothesis is concerned with state actors' behaviour and perceptions: 
1. The grievance theory does not exonerate greedy warlords, but from its balanced 
perspective to pursue peace, creates the platform to promote multi-track 
approach negotiation to offer warring parties a genuine chance for peace and 
stability. 
11. The benefit is that it enables non-state war actors the chance to find their niche 
in governance or in some cases, where greed is the motive, actors have been 
exposed Charles Taylor's as an example. Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 3) 
acknowledge that even altruistic rebel leaders, certainly in recruiting, shall 
compose both "altruistic" and "criminal" elements. This results in intensification 
of criminal activities in the course of fighting government forces. In Sierra 
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Leone, Sankor tried hard to avert plundering but in such circumstance of chaos, 
naturally, as Collier acknowledges, control of forces is critical issue and the 
worst may happen. 
5.4. The implication of war debates for policy prioritization 
If basing policy approaches on grievance, the implication is to move resources away 
from the milex to peacemaking by various stakeholders for international peace, through 
negotiation mediation and possibly to regional courts like the International and Regional 
Courts of Justice (Peck 2001: 577). If on the other side, greed becomes policy focus 
given that the military is not very effective in actually resolving conflicts, then two 
things could be done: 
1. War has to be made more costly. For example, weapons should be more difficult 
to obtain, and tax should be imposed on arms manufacturers to compensate the 
excessive harm by their usage as it is done with tobacco products. There is the 
need to impose sanctions such as an embargo on arms supply as in Cote 
d'Ivoire. The intervention with UN/AU peacekeepers as a matter of course 
should cost the particular state at war, afterwards. 
11. Peace can be made more profitable by the use of aid to finance demilitarization 
i.e. to reward countries which adopt a less militarized stance. Normally post war 
aids have involved further armament under the guise of making the military 
more capable to deter sudden offensive. For instance, the Security Council 
mission to Sierra Leone in 2004 found that country has been disappointed by 
aid promises which could undermine the peace-building process (Parry et al 
2004: item 35). 
Mehler (2005: 19, 20) contends that in spite of firm plans for conflict intervention in 
Africa, there is no "analytical backbone" influencing the prioritization of the many 
strategies proposed between Africa and EU partners, for example, as found in the Evian 
Summit (France) in 2003: 
.... to train African peace support forces, including through the development of 
regional centres of excellence to train military and civilian personnel in conflict 
prevention and peace support, and to better coordinate peacekeeping training 
initiatives. Special foci were put on reducing the number of small arms 
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circulating in Africa, helping African countries rid themselves of anti-personnel 
mines, getting close scrutiny of the link between conflict and pillage of natural 
resources, ending illicit trafficking of weapons and outlawing mercenary 
activities (Mehler2005: 19,20). 
Real social rebuilding support is relegated elsewhere as is happening in Sierra Leone 
due to uncertainty surrounding the causal factors which is made more difficult by 
theories like greed. The difficulty with intervention and preventive strategies cannot be 
oversimplified as espoused by the greed hypothesis and therefore poses misplaced 
prioritization and concentration of aid on military concerns in the peace pursuit 
processes. 
5.5. Summary 
The greed theory therefore does not help with peace-building as it demonizes non-state 
actors in conflict with the state. Pro peace-building theories and conflict analysis model 
should recognize the non-state adversary and accord warring parties equal courtesy that 
helps in mooting the steps for peaceful and sustainable resolution of conflict. It rather 
promotes the track one approach to conflict resolution where rebels are compelled to 
acquiesce to a peace deal. The state, recognizing the implication, uses that as excuse to 
increase military spending without paper accounting. In the absence of accountability 
some defence deals in Africa have been involved in massive bribery and corruption. 
This nevertheless affects other sectors of state spending which Omitoogun (2003) and 
Smaldone (2004) claim plunges the state into debt. 
With grievance the analysis indicates that its broad outlook and considerations of 
varying factors meet the nature of complexity with the new wars. Therefore the 
grievance discourse has much relevance for conflict prevention and conflict resolution 
that can last longer. This is due to its capability to promote the recognition of warring 
parties and build bridges to link them. Grievance therefore facilitates in creating a 
platform that is conducive for peace-building and restoring hope of trust by working to 
prevent "enemy image" syndrome. Grievance, therefore, discourages unnecessary arms 
build-up that has the tendency to trigger conflict. It advocates state focus on human 
security as the optimal means of achieving stability and lasting peace in post war states. 
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Chapter Six 
6. Conclusion and recommendations 
The dissertation began by highlighting some background issues pertaining to the origin 
of wars generally, context issues and sequel of wars in SSA. It also captured the brief 
historical overview of war studies and peace research initiators, definitional review of 
peacebuilding, the state and democracy concepts. It stated the goal and objectives of the 
study namely as (i) to examine the debate concerning the causes of war, with emphasis 
on grievance and greed; (ii) to review the major civil wars which have occurred in Sub-
Saharan Africa since 1990, with particular reference to their underlying causes; and (iii) 
to assesses the implications of the underlying causes of war for African military 
expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The dissertation has reviewed the milex trend in Africa from the 1990s and observed 
that high milex has an impact on human security and the general development in 
African states. It was argued that factors that caused high milex originate from the 
systemic, regional, national and the perception of state actors. In considering the issue of 
privatization of military functions, concern for demilitarization and a peaceful alternative 
to non-military conflict resolution, and early warning mechanisms, was raised. The 
chapter provides definitional review of security as a concept. It also showed that state 
security based on the military is elusive and a lack of human security results in 
disloyalty of both military and society, which can trigger conflict and violent 
consequences with human rights violations. 
Then in an effort to ascertain whatever causes new civil wars, the two main debates 
about the causes of Africa civil wars, grievance and greed hypothesis were reviewed. It 
was observed that whilst the grievance hypothesis is conducive for employing peace-
building approach due to its broad outlook of conflict; greed is not pro-peace-building 
and rather tend to augur for military security than human security. The absence of 
complimenting the various models creates a policy discrepancy which normally affects 
government budget priorities. Thus, the absence of complimenting the various 
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discourses, resolution to conflicts may be difficult and therefore the tendency for 
political actors to depend excessively on military to provide security. 
An overview of cases of major conflicts across Africa with a brief review of nature of 
pre-colonial African warfare is then presented. The majority of the new wars originated 
from revolutionary motives due to various factors which are mainly political failures . 
The issue of resources was found to be an aspect that helps mostly in the duration of the 
wars as a source of revenue to sustain major actors involved in the civil wars. However 
given the level of destruction, none of these is enough reason for rational humans to 
wage destruction and carnage beyond those acceptable in war. None of the reasons is 
convincing and justifies the proportion of loss of life and resources. 
Thus an evaluation which assessed the level of the two debates grievance and greed on 
the state policy implications of the causes of war debates and impact on military 
spending in Africa was performed. Whilst greed hypothesis is conducive for a 
distributive type of conflict resolution based on an adversarial outlook which argues 
from an econometric perception and commoditized conflict issues; it is thus not pro 
peace-building theory and the conflict analysis model should recognize the non-state 
adversary and accord warring parties equal courtesy that helps in mooting the steps for 
peaceful and sustainable resolution of conflict. Grievance is noted to create the platform 
that is conducive for peace-building and restoring hope of trust by working to prevent 
"enemy image" syndrome. Grievance therefore discourages unnecessary arms build-up 
that has a tendency to trigger conflict. It advocates state focus on human security as the 
optimal means of achieving stability and lasting peace in post war states. 
6.1. Reflection on SSA war debates and milex 
The study on causes of wars debate in Sub-Saharan Africa and its implication for milex 
showed a lack of effective systematic means of assessing new conflicts in Africa for 
durable resolution, effective preventive measures, and early warning detection. This is 
due to unnecessary conflicting causal hypothesis that does not help in effective 
decision-making and efficient internal and external resource utilization by stakeholders 
involved in African conflicts. The dissertation ends by saying that the issues raised 
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based on grievance and that of greed do not justify the level of carnage and destruction 
involved in African wars. Therefore what compels leaders to find solutions with 
violence is as a result of opportunity not based on primary commodities per se. It also 
involves the opportunity to heroism based on distorted perception of power and lack of 
social education on appropriate means for conflict resolution, lack of appropriate early 
warning mechanisms and trivialization of conflict warnings as happened in ECOWAS, 
East-Central Africa. The understanding, that is lacking at the systemic, regional, levels 
in the states and with political and non-political actors together with entire communities 
is the sense of security. We cannot provide any meaningful answer to the causes of war, 
if our sense of security is warped and distorted. Basically "human security, in the sense 
that your security is my security" underlies human practice of religion and institutions 
such as politics and military (Brown 2001). Indeed, the distortion of security from 
strong realist, patriarchal and warped masculinity perspective makes society hail 
violence as heroic, therefore violent revolutionary attempt is acclaimed as great. It 
espouses the negativity in the saying that the end justifies the means as new wars 
philosophical outlook. 
Some religious perspectives from Buddha to Jesus, Mohammed, Gandhi, and Luther 
King discouraged violence in pursuit of social, economic and political security. They 
taught love, peace, tolerance, non-aggression that should characterize true culture of 
human race. Unfortunately, the perspective of security still carried with it the symbolism 
of violence which is attributed to the distorted perception of power as exhibition and 
application of force and compulsion. This time it takes the form of the survival of the 
fittest, the strongest and the most powerful in terms of military might. That has also had 
cultural implications where masculinity connotes the ability to use force and military 
might (Francis 2004: 64f). So where there is threat to security the most obvious solution 
has been violence or war to decide the winner. Islamic Jihads and Christians' crusades 
have been represented as employment of violence, compulsion to obedience by resistant 
opponents in both political and religious spheres with contradicting ideology and 
perceptions which underlies conflicts generally. Gandhi led the entire Indian nation 
through his concept of Satyagraha based on the Hindu concept of peace and struggle to 
overthrow British colonialism. In spite of the availability of religious and philosophical 
basis for non-violence, conflict resolution in human history has generally been violent 
due to the perspective of the prevailing paradigm of power security and manhood as the 
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ability to use force and inflict violence. Today the major conflicts beyond Africa are of 
politico-religious nature such as new terrorism and Bush's "axis of evil" crusade, 
Zionism and Jihadism. At the end of the twentieth century, which holds the record of the 
two world wars and the beginning of new civil wars in Africa, there have been some 
hopes for a change for reduction of armed violence in the new twenty-first century. In a 
statement by Blair which captured this view, 
My father fought in the last great European war. I was born in 1953, a child of 
the Cold War era, raised amid the constant fear of a conflict with the potential 
to destroy all of humanity. Whatever other dangers may exist, no such fear 
exists today. Mine is the first generation able to contemplate the possibility that 
we may live our entire lives without going to war or sending our children to war. 
That is a prize beyond value and this agreement is a great contribution to it 
(Blair in Paris May 1997). 
But unfortunately and contrary to Blair's words, he was involved with US and together 
led the Iraq invasion as part of the axis of evil crusade. This was a contradiction to the 
aspiration of civil society and the UN Security Council for other peaceful alternatives 
such as tightening sanctions (M0ller 2004: 22; Oudraat 2001: 340-343). Bush and 
Blair's intelligence which led to recourse to war was found to be baseless concerning 
Hussein's "weapons of mass destruction" programme. Similarly, the carnage in most 
African conflicts has been found to be above the cost of purported basis being addressed 
by armed violence. At the level of the international community, there are policies that 
encourage arming Africa to the teeth to protect their economic interest, and not 
necessarily the welfare of such weak states. The issue of arming Africa in the interest of 
ideological and state security has been influential as a crucial factor in the causing of 
new civil wars. France, US, UK, Russia, for example, have provided resources for 
African states militarization, and in other cases, arming opposition groups to resort to 
arm struggle when politically aggrieved. Antecedent to the new civil wars are the 
foundations laid by such policies which has enormous influence to motivate recourse to 
armed insurrection rather than an individual's greed. 
Therefore, grievance actually has more justification as a key underlying factor leading 
to armed conflict in most Sub-Sahara Africa conflicts. Greed, from the perspective of 
this research, may not be the critical element to provoke issues that leads to violence 
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and wars in Africa. The study finds greed, as the meaning implies, to be parasitic 
advantage taken when there is violent conflict. Greed is found to be individual excesses 
by both rebel and state forces (sometimes involved) to use available natural resources to 
support the conflict. There is evidence of pre-colonial antecedent 'greed' in African 
tribal wars where massive cattle looting were a motivating factor but not the only 
independent variable. Greed can generate grievance, if greed is exhibited in the state 
political actors' structure. That normally leads to serious corruption and resultant state 
failure, as happened in Sierra Leone and DRC. Thus, after a review of ECOWAS, East-
Central Africa, to Southern Africa conflicts show a pattern that does not indicate greed 
as the causal link to civil wars but political structural issues which are transformed into 
ethnic, cultural, religious, and ideological bickering most of the time resulting in acute 
human rights violations that trigger violent up-risings. This comes about because the 
institutional mechanism for justice also denies justice or is not accessible to some 
minority parties or part of grieving society. In addition there have been foundations set 
already to trigger conflicts through incorrect colonial policies of 'divide-and-rule' 
politics. The dissertation has identified that greed is, most of the time, opportunistic that 
only helps to prolong conflict but is not the cause, in most cases of SSA conflicts. The 
study also identified that it is not only private rebel leaders who have such a tendency, 
but greedy governments that are biased and oppressive against a section of society and 
fails to implement conducive policy that promote social and economic justice. This is 
capable of inflaming of social protest, which if excessive military force is used by the 
state against its own citizens can result in civil war. This trend is also evident in most of 
the conflicts on other regions such as Asia and South America. 
The study concurs that the greed hypothesis shows misunderstanding of the African 
context issues which are attitudinal and peculiar ethnic mindset issues. Indeed some 
rebel leaders may be "sleeping dogs" with ulterior motives and a peculiar idiosyncrasy 
that is capable of wreaking havoc for personal gains at extreme cost. Such actors have 
the opportunity to use violence when there is the least opportunity, not caused by 
resource abundance but rather by external and internal support abundance. The resource 
factor is just one item of many. It is the issue that creates the opportunity that matters 
most. This normally lies with the political policy and system that, though assumed as 
democratic, denies its very essence in dialogue and open forum for majority and 
minority to discuss issues. Democracy is said to promote peace, but theoretically, the 
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pursuit of peace appears idealistic from the point of view of the perception that human 
nature is innately violent. It is negated by Bums' (1990: 73 - 75) argument that humans 
cannot be passive to the achievement of peace but directly "responsible" for making it 
happen. This is ignored by emerging political policies in Africa which resort instead to 
militarization alone as the most appropriate security without enhancing institutions for 
resolving conflicts, such effective judiciary and accountable civil service. And as peace 
is relevant for general human and social development and economic growth, such peace 
cannot be spelt by military might (Dower 1995: 18). According to Toh and Floresco-
Tawagas (1987: 27) peace is not unattainable in the way it is perceived without 
militarilization. In some African countries, militarization has been a critical drain on the 
economy and is incapable of effective defence in the complexity of new civil wars. 
Whilst many African states do not reveal the amount involved in military (hardware 
which should be a staggering figure), the routine maintenance and personnel 
expenditure is a tremendous burden for the overall GDP (Harris 2004: 205). This 
nevertheless portrays the drain of milex on state resources at the sacrifice of essential 
general wellbeing of citizens by the provision of cheaper social services and agriculture 
development for food production. Whilst health is declining, with many African states 
being incapable of providing Anti-Retro Viral (ARV) drugs for HIV/AIDS, incapable of 
producing enough food and deteriorating educational standards, milex is still very high 
despite critical local level development needs in many SSA states. 
6.2. Suggestions for policy considerations 
Upon issues the study has raised with regard to the debates on the causes of new civil wars in 
SSA and its correlation with milex as conventional security measure, the following 
suggestions have been proposed for policy consideration: 
a) On the causes of new civil wars debates and policy: 
1. The greed theory espouses intensive militarization as the state s 
safeguard to resist and prevent rebellion. The discussion on milex in 
SSA has shown that such state security based on the military is elusive. 
There is the need to address the underlying issues of conflict where a 
lack of proper human security results in the disloyalty of both military 
and society to the state, which triggers rebellion when human rights and 
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basic-survival needs are violated. There has been ample evidence of data 
problems with greed as a single causal variable which makes it 
inadequate and unreliable as the optimal decision guide in the context of 
SSA. 
11 . Grievance discourse is noted as having much relevance for sustainable 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The dissertation notes that 
grievance, therefore, facilitates the creation of a platform that is 
conducive for peacebuilding and restoring hope and trust by working to 
prevent enemy image syndrome. Grievance is noted to discourage 
unnecessary arms build-up that has the tendency to trigger conflict. The 
grievance discourse advocates state focus on human security as the 
optimal means of achieving stability and lasting peace in post war states. 
Grievance's multiple factors approach can help decision-makers consider 
various alternatives to the provision of security other than the over 
dependence on militarization and resultant excessive mil ex. It also 
provides a basis for the review and restructuring of social structures and 
power relations that is non-violent. 
b) On the study of cases of new civil wars in SSA the dissertation recommends 
that: 
1. None of the the two main hypothesis grievance or greed is enough reason 
for people to wage destruction and carnage beyond 'reasonable' 
ethically guided war. None of the reasons is convincing and justifies the 
proportion of loss of life and resources as an expression of selfish greed 
and grievance over human rights violation. The nature of the greed 
identified extends beyond the individual's agenda and has far reaching 
state actors' and systemic influence from external actors which should 
not be trivialized in the SSA context with its peculiarities in ethnic and 
religious diversities. 
11. In the review of new cases of new civil wars, the greed hypothesis instead 
promotes the track one approach to conflict resolution where rebels are 
compelled to acquiesce to peace deals without consideration of the 
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underlying issues. That has provided only short-term or temporary 
measures of peace which ends with a relapse into conflict by aggrieved 
parties. The dissertation advises the need to a long-term resolution of 
conflicts by peace-building based on a broader outlook of new civil war 
causes, rather than just a narrow single individual factor. 
111. The study supports the call for cooperation and convergence of research 
finding activities on new wars in SSA to provide appropriate systematic 
and effective framework for SSA conflict analysis and resolution. The 
lack of empirical evidence in most of the literature reduces the validity of 
the hypothesis and the consequence of misinformation can be 
incalculable. Only a few researchers attempt to organize their work by 
pulling the causal factors together. Currently, the new war causal factors 
are isolated and scattered across numerous works. This is indicative of an 
effective organized explanation of the causal issues evident in the level 
of recurrence and awakening of further military interventions in 
Equatorial Guinea and diplomatic conflict between The Gambia and 
Senegal. There are still rebel activities in Kivu of DRC and armed crisis 
in Lesotho, for example. 
c) On the influence of new civil wars debate on milex, the dissertation recommends 
that: 
1. The issue of privatization of military functions raised the concern for 
demilitarization and peaceful alternative to non-military (civilianization) 
conflict resolution. The new approach posed by private military comes 
with complex tactics which current SSA armies are incapable, to some 
extent, to handle. Therefore the cost of maintaining a large army should be 
reformed (Harris 2004: 205, 206). What is required first then, is cutting 
down the size of the army and its expenditure by carefully planned DDR; 
and second, adopting a democratic model that poses less of a threat to 
governments by provision of majority-minority power-sharing structures 
(Meller 2004: 22). Currently most ofthe defence decisions are confined to 
the ruling governments which tend to serve its interest and perpetuate a 
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form of power abuse and political entrenchment with the military support. 
Power-sharing between majority and minorities should encourage 
democratization of defence decision-making. 
11. The issue of social conscience on violence and wars remains critical to 
defence reform. The emerged new wars which are intra-state require 
rational political choices as well as the input of civil society on preferential 
defence security alternatives. Indeed, to what extent should military 
decisions be subject to public participation? Uniformed society certainly 
cannot make meaningful contribution in an area of which they have little 
understanding. The dissertation posits that the traditional perception of 
security itself is distorted. Therefore, an effective effort to democratize 
defence decision requires some level of perception transformation which 
comprehends security not as force and domination, but rather human 
security, in the sense that 'your security is my security'. Generally the 
need for appropriate social education on peace, security and violence is 
necessary in Africa where the last two decades have been governed by 
violence in terms of wars and high levels of organized crime due to the 
proliferation of small-light weapons (Maxwell 2004: 123, l32, l33). The 
need to demilitarize social conscience is imperative for new security 
perspective (Harris 2004: 206). The state needs to propose such policies 
of social education and get civil society organizations and entire 
communities to take it up as national security task. 
iii. The dissertation therefore suggests that militarization is not an effective 
optimal choice for defence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed neither is 
militarization efficient to defence counting on the resource input and the 
time used to achieve objectives at lesser cost by considering alternatives 
(Harris 2004: 199,200). Military solutions do not offer efficient solutions 
by considering the proportionate cost in human and material resources 
destroyed. ECOWAS, East to Central Africa and Southern African 
conflicts bear evidence of military solution to demand political change or 
arrest rebellion against governments as ineffective and inefficient. The 
need for setting up peace constituencies in communities and state level 
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supervision can help prevent conflicts reaching violent stages (Lederach 
2002: 94). Such organization can serve as part of early warning 
mechanisms. 
IV. It would be expedient if multinational aids are directed to support services 
and capacity building at the local levels. Allowing aid to refurbish the 
state military only exacerbates the neglected role and irresponsible statism 
that entrench rent patronage, corruption, exclusion politics and executive 
plundering of state resources. Governments of post-war states should 
provide a strategic plan of action on the use of aids and should be open to 
external monitoring and evaluation. 
v. Finally, external factors that contribute to rearmament and makes DDR 
difficult include arms manufacturers and dealers. The imposition of high 
tax and rewarding post-war governments with further aid based on 
reduced rnilex and effective DDR could help in redirecting resources to 
nation building. It would be effective if post-war states that recourse to 
excessive rearmament are not encouraged with strict conditional loan and 
grant facilities. Strictly conditional aid can be diverted to activities that 
have less priority for reconstruction and peacebuilding (Harris 2004: 208t). 
The onus is on the international stakeholders for Africa's peace to 
recognize the role proliferation of light-weapons having contributed to the 
insecurity in the region. This also requires commitment to arms and light-
weapons conventions signed by African governments within their 
respective sub-regional organizations and its enforcement. 
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The burden of military expenditure: mil itary expenditure as a share of GOP in 
- . , . 
ten countries with the highest milex : GOP ratio in Africa 1991·1999. 
Countries 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Algeria 1.2 2.2 2.6 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.7 4.0 3.8 
Angola 6.8 1'2.0 12.5 19.8 17.6 19.5 22.3 11.4 23.5 
Botswana 4.4 4.3 4.5 3.9 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.7 3.4 
Burundi 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.2 5.7 6.3 5.9 6.1 
Djibouti 5.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 5.1 4.2 4.5 4.4 -
Eritrea - - 21.4 13.0 19.9 22.8 13.5 29.0 2.2 .9 
Ethiopia 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.0 1.9 3.4 5.1 9.0 
Morocco 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.9 4.7 3.9 - - . 
Rwanda 5.5 4.4 4.6 3.4 3.9 5.2 4.1 4.3 4 .2 
Zimbabwe 3.B 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.2 3.4 2.7 3.4 .. 
Source : SIPRI Yearbook 2001 : Armaments , DIsarmament and International Security 
(Oxford :OUP. 2001) 
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Item 3. 
World and regional military expenditure estimates 1996 - 2005 
Figures are in US$ b., at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages. 
Figures do not always add up to totals because of the convention of rounding. 
Change 
Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 96-05 
Africa 8.6 8.7 9.4 10.5 11.1 11.1 12.1 11.9 12.6 12.7 +48 
North 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.6 5.5 +58 
Sub-Saharan 5.1 5.0 5.6 6.6 6.8 6.6 7.3 6.9 (7.0) (7.2) +42 
America 347 349 340 341 353 358 399 447 485 513 +48 
Carribean 
Central 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.2 -2 
North 328 327 319 320 332 335 375 425 463 489 +49 
South 15.7 18.1 17.5 17.1 17.8 19.9 20.4 18.3 18.9 20.6 +31 
Asia, Oceania 116 118 119 122 126 132 138 144 152 157 +36 
Central 0.5 0.5 (0.5) 0.5 (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.8) (+77) 
East 91.0 91.9 92.9 92.9 95.5 101 107 112 116 120 +32 
Oceania 8.6 8.8 9.1 9.6 9.5 9.9 10.3 10.6 11.1 11.5 +32 
South 15.5 16.5 17.1 19.2 19.9 20.5 20.6 21.2 23.9 25.0 +61 
Europe 236 239 234 238 243 243 249 256 260 256 +8 
Central 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.4 11.5 12.1 12.3 12.8 12.7 11.7 +10 
Eastern 15.6 17.5 11.5 11.9 15.8 17.3 19.1 20.4 21.4 23.3 +50 
Western 209 210 210 214 215 214 218 223 226 220 +5 
Middle-East 39.0 43.4 46.5 45.8 51.5 55.0 52.6 55.0 58.9 (63 .0) (+61) 
World 747 756 748 757 784 800 851 914 969 1001 +34 
Change(%) 1.3 -1.1 1.2 3.6 2.0 6.4 7.5 5.9 3.4 
( ) = Total based on country data accounting for less than 90% the regional total; 
.. = Available data account for less than 60% ofthe regional total. 
Some countries are excluded because of lack of data or consistent time series data. Africa excludes 
Angola, Benin, Equitorial Guinea and Somalia; America excludes Cuba, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago; 
Asia excludes Myanmar and Viet Nam; and Middle-East excludes Iraq and Qatar. 
World totals exclude all these countries. 
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Item 5. 
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Item 6. 
The column on Military Expenditure as percentage of combined education 
and health expenditure shows that some countries spend much more on 
military expenditure than on the social sectors. The following 7 countries 
show highest military expenditure for the period 1990-91 as a percentage of 
combined education and health expenditure. 
• Angola is top with 208% 
• Ethiopia 190% 
• Mozambique 121 % 
• Tanzania 77% 
• Morocco 72% 
• Zimbabwe 66% 
• Zambia 63% 
As noted above, Angola and Mozambique are heavy military spenders and 
poor spenders in the social sectors. In Angola in 1995, the female literacy 
rate was 29% against 56% for men. During the period 1985-95, only 30% of 
the population had access to health services while 32% had access to safe 
water. During 1990 to 1996, only 15% of the births were attended by trained 
health personnel. At the same time the maternal mortality rate stood at 1500 
per 100000 live births! The infant mortality rate at 170 per 1000 live births, 
and 191 per 1000 for Under-5 Mortality Rate(U5MR). It would therefore seem 
correct to say that high military spending coupled with a heavy debt burden 
take investment away from the social sectors and women and children suffer 
a great deal from poor health and unnecessary deaths. Notably, such 
countries as Nigeria, Egypt, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Sudan and 
Tunisia indicate significant reduction in military spending relative to health 
and education expenditure. 
Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 1997, p.14 
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Item 7. 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
(WMEAT) 
The u.s. State Department Bureau of Anns Control's World Military Expenditures and 
Anns Transfers (WMEAT) report, most recently published on February 6, 2003, 
provides figures for the ten-year period from 1989 to 1999. WMEAT uses the World 
Bank's average 1999 market exchange rates in order to calculate military expenditures 
for most countries.s In cases where no appropriate exchange rate is available, WMEAT 
uses PPP estimates. 
For NATO members, WMEAT measures military expenditures according to a common 
definition that includes military retired pay and military-type expenditures of defense 
ministries. In this definition, a) civilian-related expenditures of defense ministries are 
excluded and military-related expenditures of other ministries are included; b) grant 
military assistance is included in the expenditures of the donor country; c) purchases of 
military equipment for credit are included at the time the debt is incurred, not at the time 
of payment. 
For most other countries, figures represent the expenditures of the ministry of defense. 
When these are known to include the costs of internal security, an attempt is made to 
remove such expenditures. A wide variety of data sources is used for these countries, 
including the publications and data resources of other U.S. 
Source: Chamberlain 2004. http://www.jas.org/manicrs/RL32209.pdj 
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Item 8. 
Source: ©MAGELLAN Geographix Santa Barbara, CA (800) 929-4MAP - 1999 
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